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Burnett, Brian Matthew (Ph.D., Accounting) 
 
Essays on Disclosure and Legal Origin 
 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Bjorn N. Jorgensen 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays. 
 
Chapter 1:  
 
I exploit a regulatory change that mandated Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) firms to 
comply with the reporting requirements of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to examine: 1) firm 
characteristics associated with voluntary disclosure of financial statement information, and 2) the 
valuation role of financial statement information in voluntary and mandatory reporting disclosure 
environments.  Prior to this regulatory change, disclosure of financial statement information was 
voluntary for most OTCBB firms.  I study firms that initiate filing with the SEC after this 
regulatory change, and classify these firms as disclosing and non-disclosing firms based on 
whether they voluntarily disclosed financial statement information to the public (but did not file 
with the SEC) prior to the regulatory change.  In these firms’ initial SEC filings I am able to 
observe ex post the prior year financial statement information even for non-disclosing firms that 
had previously withheld this information.  I find that the choice to voluntary disclose financial 
statements is associated with firm characteristics related to lower proprietary costs, lower agency 
costs, and more useful accounting information in valuation.  In association-based tests, I find 
evidence consistent with firms voluntarily disclosing financial statement information when the 
information is useful for valuation and otherwise not disclosing.  My evidence also suggests that 
non-disclosed accounting information is reflected in stock prices in real time. 
 
Chapter 2 (co-authored with Bjorn N. Jorgensen and Jeffrey C. Merrell): 
 
This essay provides evidence on the link between legal origin and earnings attributes often 
associated with earnings quality. Prior studies perform country-level analyses and find evidence 
that earnings quality is higher in counties with common law (English legal origin) than in 
countries with civil law (which includes French legal origin). This paper takes a different 
approach and exploits within-country variation in Canada. Specifically our research is motivated 
by the observation that all Canadian providences have common law with the exception of 
Quebec which has civil law. We investigate whether common earnings attributes typically 
associated with earnings quality vary at the firm-level. We find that earnings attributes do vary 
with legal origin. Further, we analyze Canadian firms’ decision regarding where to incorporate at 
either the Federal or province level. Our evidence suggests that Quebec firms’ incorporation 
decision at either the Federal (common law) or province (civil law) leads to some differences in 
earnings quality, after controlling for differences in accounting standards hypothesized by Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000). 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Market Implications of Voluntary Accounting Disclosures in the Absence of a Mandatory 
Disclosure Requirement: Evidence from the OTCBB 
 
Introduction 
Public trading of securities in the US typically requires mandatory disclosure of financial 
statement information.  Prior to 1999, however, disclosure of financial statement information 
was voluntary for most firms traded on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB).1  
Consistent with predictions from the analytical literature on voluntary disclosure, some firm 
managers disclosed financial statement information while others did not.  Nevertheless, prices 
are observable for all firms regardless of disclosure.  I exploit a regulatory change on the 
OTCBB to observe ex post the financial statement information non-disclosing firms previously 
elected to withhold.  Specifically, on January 4, 1999, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) approved the Eligibility Rule, which required firms to comply with the 
periodic disclosure requirements of the 1934 Exchange Act to continue trading on the OTCBB.  
Those firms that chose to remain on the OTCBB began filing with the SEC and were required to 
provide current year information as well as at least one prior year of information (i.e., accounting 
information for the voluntary disclosure period). 
I use this setting where disclosure is voluntary to first examine firm characteristics 
associated with voluntary disclosure.  I find firms’ likelihood of disclosure is negatively related 
to research and development activities, Development Stage Enterprise (DSE) firms2, and 
ownership concentration.  These results are consistent with firms guarding proprietary 
                                                 
1 Technically, SEC Rule 15c2-11 required firms to provide a balance sheet, income statement, and retained earnings 
statement to a market maker once to initiate a quotation, but with no obligation to update that information.  I control 
for this in my research design. 
2 Development Stage Enterprises are firms that in the process of commencing operations and have little to no 
revenues.  Relative to non-DSE firms, DSE firms are valued almost entirely based on a growth option where 
accounting information is less likely to be useful in valuing these firms. 
2 
 
information, not disclosing when accounting information is less useful in valuation, and not 
disclosing when agency costs are likely lower.  I also find that firms’ likelihood of disclosure is 
positively associated with size, which is consistent with high firm size resulting in decreasing 
costs to disclosure, greater returns to information acquisition, and/or increased litigation risk.   
Second, I use this setting to examine whether stock prices relate to disclosed and non-
disclosed accounting information.  Mandatory disclosure laws implicitly assume that: (1) 
financial statements provide useful information to investors, and (2) public disclosure of 
financial statement information is necessary for stock prices to reflect this information.  In 
contrast, theoretical research suggests that in the absence of disclosure investors set prices that, 
on average, correctly infer non-disclosed information (e.g., Verrecchia 1983, Dye 1985).  
Further, alternative channels to public disclosure, such as insider trading, may partially or fully 
incorporate private information into stock prices (e.g., Kyle 1985, Manne 1966).  Since many 
companies on the OTCBB are small, start-up enterprises, their financial statements may not 
provide useful information for investors’ resource allocation decisions.   
Understanding whether stock prices reflect accounting information in a voluntary 
disclosure setting provides insights about the effects of modern mandatory SEC disclosure 
regulation.  Theoretical research suggests that the appropriate benchmark to evaluate the effects 
of mandatory disclosure is to first understand what firms would have voluntary disclosed in the 
absence of regulation (e.g., Dye 1990).  Thus, this setting provides an observable benchmark to 
evaluate the effects of mandatory disclosure regulation.  For firms that did not disclose prior to 
this regulatory change, which I label “non-disclosing” firms, mandatory SEC disclosure 
requirements impose a significant shift in the firms’ information environment.  In contrast, this 
regulatory change should have an immaterial direct effect on “disclosing” firms because they 
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voluntarily disclosed.  Mandatory disclosure, however, may enhance the comparability and 
credibility of their disclosures since mandatory disclosure provides a credible commitment to 
reveal information independent of economic outcomes. 
I find a weak association between prices and accounting information for non-disclosing 
firms both before and after the imposition of SEC disclosure requirements.  The coefficient of 
book value becomes positive and significant during the period of mandatory disclosure and the 
adjusted R2 increases consistent with mandatory disclosure providing some new information to 
investors.  However, the overall weak association between stock prices and accounting 
information seems most consistent with accounting information playing a minimal role in 
valuation for the (previously) non-disclosing firms.  In contrast, I find a strong association 
between prices and accounting information for disclosing firms both before and after the 
imposition of SEC disclosure requirements.  Taken together, these results are consistent with 
firms voluntarily disclosing financial statement information when it is useful for valuation, and 
not disclosing otherwise.   
 I further evaluate the non-disclosing firms and partition non-disclosing firms by whether 
they are classified as DSE firms (Willenborg 1999).  As Willenborg notes, from an ex ante 
perspective accounting information is less likely to be relevant for pricing DSEs.  DSE firms 
primarily represent a growth option where accounting information is less likely to be useful in 
valuation.  Consistent with his argument, I find no association between prices and accounting 
information for non-disclosing DSEs either before or after SEC disclosure requirements.  In 
contrast, I find a weak association between prices and accounting information for non-disclosing 
non-DSE firms before and after the imposition of SEC regulation, but no increase in the 
association.  These results are consistent with stock prices in the prior period reflecting non-
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disclosed accounting information.  Further, the results of this partition are consistent with non-
disclosing firm managers withholding accounting information because it is not useful in 
valuation.   
 This paper makes the following contributions.  First, it provides new insights to the role 
of accounting information in unregulated markets.  Prior research studying the role of accounting 
information in unregulated markets focuses on how substantial discretion in accounting method 
choice affects the credibility of accounting information (e.g., Sivakumar and Waymire 1993, Ely 
and Waymire 1999, Barton and Waymire 2004).  Because I am able to ex post observe the 
information the non-disclosing firms withheld, I study how discretion over whether or not to 
disclose accounting information relates to stock prices.   
 Second, a vast literature considers the economic consequences of mandated changes in 
accounting standards (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Fields et al. 2001).  As Bushee and Leuz 
(2005) point out, these studies occur in the already-rich SEC disclosure environment.  These 
studies focus on changes in how firms report accounting information.  My study examines a 
much more radical shift in financial reporting.  I identify firms that did not previously disclose 
any financial statement information and then examine whether the imposition of SEC disclosure 
requirements enhances the association between stock prices and accounting information.3    
 Third, my study contributes to studies examining the OTCBB by providing specific 
evidence on the role of accounting in this market.  Luft et al. (2001) and Luft and Levine (2004) 
focus on the market microstructure.  They document that OTCBB securities yield lower returns 
with higher risk than securities on the major exchanges.  They further document low liquidity 
                                                 
3 Sivakumar and Waymire (2003) study the impact of the first federal accounting rules in US history on earnings 
attributes.  The accounting rules were passed in 1907 and 1908 for regulation of US railroads.  My study is distinct 
from this in that I study the impact of modern SEC disclosure requirements and study both non-disclosing and 
disclosing firms.  
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and high volatility, which they attribute to a lack of financial information and third party 
research.  Bushee and Leuz (2005) study the economic consequences of the Eligibility Rule.  
They document specific costs and benefits for affected firms in terms of their market value and 
liquidity as well as some evidence of positive externalities (see Section 2 for a more detailed 
description).  My study provides direct evidence on the relationship between stock prices and 
accounting information for OTCBB firms before and after the Eligibility Rule.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides the historical background of US 
securities regulation and the institutional details of the OTCBB.  Section 3 offers a literature 
review.  I discuss Hypothesis development and research design in Section 4.  Section 5 describes 
the data collection.  In Section 6 I report on the association between stock prices and accounting 
information.  In Section 7 I perform sensitivity analyses.  Section 8 concludes.   
 
 
1. History of US Securities Regulation and Institutional Setting of OTCBB 
1.1  History of US Securities Regulation  
 Federal regulation of US securities began with the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 
(1933 Act).4  Existing state-level securities laws were largely superseded by federal regulation.  
Congress and the President passed the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act to remedy the lack of reliable 
information about securities, perceived to be the primary cause of the stock market crash of 
1929.  Congress and the President premised the Acts based on the principle of “full and fair” 
disclosure.  Together the 1933 and 1934 Acts require exchange-listed companies to disclose 
audited financial statements and details about the company’s business.  Additionally, the Acts 
significantly increase civil liability for fraud. 
                                                 
4 Interstate railroads and public utilities had been subject to federal regulation prior to the 1933 Act and the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act (1934 Act). 
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 The Acts pertained to exchange-listed companies, which left most firms in the OTC 
market free from federal regulation.5  Two subsequent regulatory changes expanded the periodic 
reporting requirements of the 1934 Act to a significant number of OTC firms.  The first change 
was passed in 1964 in response to concerns about fraud and the growth of the OTC market.  
Congress passed the 1964 Securities Amendments Acts (1964 Acts), which subjected OTC firms 
above a size and shareholder threshold ($1 million in assets and 500 shareholders, respectively) 
to the same disclosure requirements as exchange-listed firms.  This resulted in a substantial 
change in the scope of firms required to comply with mandatory disclosure.  The second change 
was also adopted in response to concerns about fraud in the OTC market as well.  On January 4, 
1999, the SEC approved Eligibility Rule requiring firms on the OTCBB to become reporting 
companies regardless of size or the number of shareholders.   
 Mandatory disclosure requirements and their enforcement are defining features of US 
securities markets.  Many researchers question the necessity of mandatory disclosure to achieve 
well-functioning markets (e.g., Stigler 1964, Benston 1973).  Others argue mandatory disclosure 
is essential to maintain efficient markets (e.g., Coffee 1984).  For empirical researchers 
interested in understanding the impact of US federal securities regulation, the 1933 Act, the 1934 
Act, the 1964 Acts, and the Eligibility Rule represent fertile (research) ground to gain such 
understanding. 
1.2 Institutional Setting 
 To describe the OTCBB setting, I follow Bushee and Leuz’s (2005) discussion of the 
salient features of the OTCBB market before and after the Eligibility Rule.  In 1998, the OTCBB 
represented a sizable market segment with over 6,000 domestic issues, an average daily trading 
                                                 
5 In 1936, Congress passed an amendment to the 1934 Act which required OTC firms to register with the SEC and 
begin filing periodic reports under the 1934 Act if the firms issued more than $2 million in a securities offering.   
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volume over $200 million and an estimated market capitalization of over $50 billion. Formed in 
response to the mandate of the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 to enhance price transparency in 
the OTC market, the OTCBB is an electronic quotation medium that collects and disseminates 
real-time quotes, transaction prices, and volume data for small-cap OTC securities.6   
A key distinction between the OTCBB and the national exchanges is the absence of 
quantitative financial listing requirements (e.g., minimum net worth or market capitalization) for 
firms quoted on the OTCBB.  Firms only need to find a broker/dealer willing to make a market 
in their stock to begin quotation and, in contrast to the national exchanges, firms do not have a 
formal relationship with the OTCBB.  The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD, 
now part of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) is entrusted with operating and 
regulating the OTCBB.  During the period of this study, the NASD delegated the actual 
execution of operating and regulating this market to its subsidiary, NASDAQ.  The OTCBB 
differs from the Pink Sheets, which is another OTC market segment.  The Pink Sheets are 
characterized by less price transparency during the period of this study because it started 
electronic quotations in 1999 and a supporting web portal in 2000. 
 Prior to January 1999, approximately 3,500 firms on the OTCBB were not required to file 
periodic financial reports with the SEC.  These firms were exempt from SEC regulation because 
they: (1) never issued securities under the 1933 Act, and (2) were below the size or “owners of 
record” thresholds stated in Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act.  Issuers registering an offering under 
the 1933 Act trigger periodic reporting requirements in accordance with Section 15(d) of the 
1934 Act.  Firms frequently avoid registering under the 1933 Act by qualifying for an 
exemption.  For example, Regulation D Rule 504 exempts offering up to $1 million in a 12-
month period.  Section 12(g) details the size and shareholder thresholds of the 1934 Act as firms 
                                                 
6 In general, an OTC security is any security that is not listed or traded on a national exchange or NASDAQ.    
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exceeding $10 million in assets and with a class of securities held by more than 500 owners of 
record on the last day of the fiscal year register their securities under the 1934 Act.  The actual 
number of individual shareholders often exceeds the owners of record because all shares held in 
“street name” by each brokerage firm or clearinghouse count as only one owner.   
While exempt from the 1934 Act reporting requirements, these 3,500 firms were required 
to provide financial statement information once, upon initial quotation on the OTCBB.  
Specifically, SEC Rule 15c2-11 required the initial broker/dealer making a market in these 
securities to obtain current financial statement information (with no audit requirement) from 
issuers.7  The market maker did not need to subsequently obtain updated information.  Further, 
after thirty days, the “piggyback” exemption permitted other market makers to issue quotes 
without obtaining updated financial information.  As a result, financial statement information 
was generally not publicly available for these firms.8   
  However, these lax requirements created some challenges in the OTCBB market.  An 
article published by the Wall Street Journal on September 4, 1997 documented a surge of fraud 
and a lack of financial information on the OTCBB that marked the first of several events that 
would lead to the Eligibility Rule.  Shortly thereafter, on September 22, 1997, the US Senate 
held a committee meeting on fraud in OTC markets.  SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, Jr., testified 
before the committee that fraud was a problem in the OTC markets (S. Hrg. 105-226 9/22/97).  
The NASD also expressed concern about the OTCBB.  Both the SEC and the NASD expressed 
concern that electronic quotation of real-time data provided on the OTCBB gave investors a 
                                                 
7 Paragraph (g)(1) of Rule 15c2-11 defines current as six months.  If the balance sheet provided is more than six 
months old at the initial quotation, then the firm must provide an income statement and retained earnings statement 
updated to a more current date. 
8 Bushee and Leuz (2005) confirmed this in interviews with officials from NASDAQ, the SEC and several OTCBB 
market makers.  I also conducted interviews with OTCBB market makers who confirmed that financial statement 
information was not generally available during this time.  
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misleading impression about the reliability of firms traded on the OTCBB.  Additionally, the 
NASD was deeply concerned about damage to the reputation of NASDAQ as the OTCBB was 
often linked to NASDAQ.9   
 Ultimately, the NASD and SEC increased the disclosure requirements of the OTCBB.  
On December 9, 1997, the NASD Board of Governors indicated it was considering requiring 
firms to file with the SEC to remain on the OTCBB.  On February 13, 1998, the NASD Board of 
Governors proposed limiting the OTCBB to firms that filed period reports with the SEC.  After a 
brief period for public comment, the NASD approved this restriction by passing the Eligibility 
Rule in May 1998 as amendments to NASD rules 6530 and 6540.  The SEC announced its 
approval of the Eligibility Rule on January 4, 1999. 
 The Eligibility Rule required OTCBB firms to file the periodic reports specified in 
Section 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 Act with the SEC, except banks and insurance companies 
which were allowed to make filings with the appropriate regulatory authority rather than the 
SEC.  The rule required firms to file a registration statement, Form 10, under the 1934 Act or a 
10-K with equivalent information and the financial statements had to be audited.  Each 
company’s initial filing provided the current year’s financial statement information and at least 
one year of prior information for small business filers and up to two years for non-small business 
filers.  For firms that previously did not disclose financial statement information for the year 
preceding the Eligibility Rule, it now became possible to observe the information they elected 
not to disclose.  After the initial filing, the rule required firms to file current reports, 10-Qs and 
8-Ks, as well as annual reports, 10-Ks, to maintain their quotation on the OTCBB.  Investors 
                                                 
9 For example, Bedford Holdings, Inc. disclosed the following, “The Company's Common Stock is quoted under the 
symbol ‘BFHI’ on the NASDAQ Electronic Bulletin Board.”  This could confuse investors and blurs the line 
between NASDAQ and the OTCBB. 
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could easily access the filings on the SEC’s EDGAR database.  For most firms, this dramatically 
increased the amount of publicly available financial statement information.  The amount of 
public and private enforcement also increased following firms’ registration with the SEC.  Firms 
were now under the scrutiny of the SEC, while Section 18 of the 1934 Act significantly 
increased firms’ civil liability, making private enforcement easier for investors. 
 The Eligibility Rule was phased in on a monthly basis starting in July 1999 and ending 
June 2000 based on firms’ ticker symbols on January 4, 1999.  This gave firms from 6 to 18 
months to prepare their SEC filings.  Each month, the OTCBB reviewed approximately 100-300 
firms for compliance with the Eligibility Rule.  The phase-in schedule provided the OTCBB with 
adequate time to review compliance.  One month prior to each phase-in date, the OTCBB 
reviewed firms’ compliance and appended an ‘E’ to non-compliant firms’ ticker symbols.  When 
firms subsequently complied with the Rule, then the ‘E’ was removed.  Otherwise, the firms 
were deleted from the OTCBB at the phase-in date.   
 The OTCBB reviewed 5,402 firms for compliance (see Table 1).  The Eligibility Rule did 
not affect 1,899 firms because they had already registered and were filing with the SEC when the 
rule was passed (Already Compliant firms).10  Of the 3,503 firms affected by the Eligibility 
Rule, approximately three quarters of these firms did not comply and were forced off the 
OTCBB (Noncompliant firms).  Most of these firms moved to the Pink Sheets (Bushee and Leuz 
2005).   The remaining firms complied with the Eligibility Rule and continued quotation on the 
OTCBB (Newly Compliant firms).   
  
                                                 
10 To facilitate comparison with Bushee and Leuz (2005), I use the same labels. 
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2. Literature Review  
 The guidance from theoretical research regarding the necessity of mandatory disclosure 
regulation is equivocal.  The well-known “unraveling” result of early theoretical work predicts 
full disclosure of private information when disclosure is truthful and costless (Grossman 1981, 
Milgrom 1981).  However, full disclosure is rarely observed in capital markets.  Later work 
models a cost to truthful disclosure and predicts a partial disclosure equilibrium, where firms 
with (un)favorable information do (not) disclose (Verrecchia 1983).11  In this framework, firms 
disclose information when the benefits exceed the costs and investors set prices that, on average, 
correctly infer non-disclosed information.   
 In addition, alternative information channels to public disclosure may result in stock 
prices reflecting non-disclosed information.  Insiders trading in the stock will incorporate private 
information into their decisions to buy and sell (e.g., Manne 1966).  Kyle (1985) suggests that 
without a public information signal, insiders reveal a portion of their private information.  
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2010) show that investors infer non-disclosed information from 
disclosure by comparable firms.   
 From a theoretical perspective, the need for mandatory disclosure is not obvious.  
Nevertheless, mandatory disclosure requirements are observed around the world (Healy and 
Palepu 2001, Frost et al. 2006, Leuz 2010).  The literature provides four main justifications for 
mandatory disclosure: (1) positive externalities, (2) market-wide cost savings, (3) insufficient 
private (or public) sanctions, and (4) dead-weight costs from agency conflicts and fraud (Leuz 
2010).12  Mandatory disclosure may create positive externalities, such as information transfers 
                                                 
11 Other work also predicts a partial disclosure equilibrium when investors are uncertain about whether management 
is informed (Dye 1985, Jung and Kwon 1988).  In my setting, investors likely believe that firms have financial 
statement information. 
12 For a comprehensive discussion of these justifications, see Leuz and Wysocki (2008). 
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and liquidity spillovers (Dye 1990, Admati and Pfleiderer 2000).  However, negative 
externalities may arise from mandatory disclosure (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty 1989).  Mandatory 
disclosure requirements can save costs to firms when they require disclosures almost all firms 
would voluntarily provide anyway (Ross 1979).  Further, mandatory disclosure may provide 
firms with a more credible commitment device than they could otherwise contract privately.  A 
credible commitment device can benefit firms by increasing market liquidity (Verrecchia 2001).  
Finally, mandatory disclosure may reduce agency conflicts by minimizing controlling insiders’ 
consumption of private benefits. 
Prior to mandatory disclosure, the empirical literature on the role of accounting 
information in unregulated markets focuses on how managerial discretion in financial reporting 
can affect its credibility and whether market forces enhance the credibility of reported numbers 
(e.g., Waymire and Sivakumar 1993, Ely and Waymire 1999, and Barton and Waymire 2004).  
For example, Waymire and Sivakumar (1993) study 51 NYSE industrials during 1905-1910 
when managers had considerable flexibility in reporting earnings.  They find negative earnings 
and dividend changes are associated with returns, but that positive earnings changes are only 
associated with returns for dividend-paying firms.  The results are consistent with favorable 
earnings information being less credible than negative information.  Collectively, these studies 
suggest financial reporting in a discretionary environment is informative to capital markets, but 
that the market discounts some favorable news (e.g., positive earnings changes and intangibles) 
as opportunistic reporting.   
 Empirical investigations of the impact of federal securities regulation began with Stigler 
(1964).  He investigates whether investors are better off after the mandatory disclosure imposed 
by the 1933 Act.  He examines two groups of NYSE issues: (1) new issues from 1923-1928 and 
13 
 
(2) new issues from 1949-1955.  He finds that the returns on new issues after mandatory 
disclosure are the same as the returns on new issues before mandatory disclosure.  He also finds 
that the variance of stock returns decreases after mandatory disclosure.  Overall, he concludes 
that mandatory disclosure had little beneficial effect for new issues, and may have had a 
detrimental effect by excluding risky, new companies from accessing public capital.  While 
controversial, subsequent studies using modern empirical techniques support Stigler’s findings 
(i.e., Jarrell 1981, Simon 1989).13   
 Studies of the 1934 Act fail to document significant benefits.  Benston (1973) is the first 
empirical investigation of the impact of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  His study relies on 
the observation that prior to the 1934 Act, some firms on the NYSE disclosed sales information 
and some firms did not disclose sales information.  After the 1934 Act, all firms were required to 
disclose sales information.  His main finding is that the stock return residuals are similar for both 
groups both before and after the 1934 Act.  He concludes that the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of the 1934 Act provided no discernible benefit to investors.  Subsequent research 
on the 1934 Act documents no significant benefits either (i.e., Chow 1983, Daines and Jones 
2005, Mahoney and Mei 2006).  Mahoney and Mei (2006) argue that the contractual-based 
disclosure system of the NYSE already provided investors with equivalent information to the 
mandatory disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act.  Their final conclusion is that in the context 
of a strong legal system, a securities regulator may not yield substantial benefits above voluntary 
and contractual disclosure.   
 Although studies of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act fail to document significant benefits from 
federal regulation, recent work examining the 1964 Acts and the Eligibility Rule documents 
                                                 
13 Simon (1989) argues the reduced variance of returns is more consistent with better information reducing investor 
forecast errors than with the Stigler’s crowding out argument. 
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significant costs and benefits associated with mandatory SEC disclosure.  One difficulty in 
studying the Securities Acts is that the volatile market conditions of the 1930s may impede 
researchers’ ability to precisely measure the impact of the Acts.  Studying the 1964 Acts and the 
Eligibility Rule provide less volatile settings and natural control groups (companies already 
filing with the SEC) to better measure the impact of mandatory SEC disclosure regulation.   
 Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) exploit the 1964 Acts to study the 
effects of mandatory SEC disclosure regulation.  They estimate that OTC firms that went from 
no SEC reporting to full SEC reporting earned abnormal excess returns ranging from 11.5 to 
22.1 percent in the period between the initial proposal of the legislation and when it became law.  
They suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to better focus on maximizing 
shareholder value.  In a concurrent paper around the adoption of the 1964 Acts, Ferrell (2007) 
finds that mandatory disclosure results in a reduction in the volatility of OTC stock returns. 
 Bushee and Leuz (2005) study the Eligibility Rule.  They document significant costs and 
benefits associated with mandatory disclosure regulation.  First, as discussed in Section 2, they 
document that approximately three quarters of the 3,503 affected firms (those not previously 
filing with the SEC) are forced into a less regulated market at a significant cost in terms of 
market value and liquidity.  Second, stock returns suggest that the regulatory change was costly 
for the quarter of firms that chose to comply with the mandatory SEC disclosure obligations.  
These firms, however, did experience an increase in liquidity upon compliance.  Finally, they 
find evidence of positive externalities that are likely due to liquidity spillovers or an enhanced 
reputation of the OTCBB.  They are able to measure externalities by examining OTCBB firms 
already filing with the SEC that presumably should be unaffected by the Eligibility Rule, except 
for potential externalities.   
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 The main justification for the 1933, 1934, 1964 Acts and the Eligibility Rule was a lack 
of current, reliable financial statement information about issuers.  My study contributes to this 
literature by directly studying whether financial statement information is reflected in stock prices 
when disclosure of financial statement information is voluntary (i.e., no contractual or mandatory 
reporting obligations), and whether modern mandatory SEC disclosure requirements increase the 
association between stock prices and financial statement information. 
 
3. Hypotheses Development and Research Design 
 My study focuses on the Newly Compliant firms that choose to begin filing periodic 
reports with the SEC.  Prior to the Eligibility Rule, the costs of filing with the SEC exceeded the 
benefits, or these firms would have voluntarily filed with the SEC (Bushee and Leuz 2005).  
Forced to choose their second best alternative, these firms start filing with the SEC to remain on 
the OTCBB.  My research design is similar to Berger and Hann (2003) and Botosan and Stanford 
(2005), who note that after mandatory change in segment reporting it is possible to observe ex 
post information firms chose not to disclose in real time.  In my setting, I use Newly Compliant 
firms’ initial SEC filings to observe ex post financial statement information many firms chose 
not to disclose in real time.  Regardless of disclosure, however, investors traded in both sets of 
firms’ stocks and prices are observable for all firms during the voluntary disclosure regime.  The 
Newly Compliant firms allow me to examine the role of accounting information in both 
voluntary and mandatory reporting regimes.  
 I begin by examining firm characteristics associated with the choice to voluntarily 
disclose financial statement information in the voluntary disclosure period.  A strength of this 
setting is that my proxy for voluntary disclosure does not also capture mandatory, a problem with 
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most empirical studies on voluntary disclosure (Beyer et al. 2010).  The disclosure literature 
suggests important costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure include a higher valuation, 
liquidity, cost of capital, access to financing, proprietary costs, and agency costs.  I use book-to-
market, firm size, firm profitability, research and development expenditures, ownership 
structure, and industry concentration as proxies for these costs and benefits (e.g, Lang and 
Lundholm 1993, Healy and Palepu 2001, Bushee and Leuz 2005, Botosan and Stanford 2005).  I 
also include an indicator variable for development stage enterprises to capture that financial 
statement information may be less useful in valuing these firms and lead to less disclosure of this 
information.  I expect that book-to-market, research and development expenditures, development 
stage enterprise status, ownership concentration, and industry concentration (four-firm 
concentration ratio, where higher values indicate less competitive industries) to be negatively 
related to disclosure.  I expect size to be positively related to disclosure.  The expected sign on 
profitability depends on the importance of agency costs and proprietary cost considerations 
(Healy and Palepu 2001).   
Next, I examine non-disclosing firms.  Non-disclosing firms are of particular interest 
because they enable me to examine whether prices reflect non-disclosed accounting information.  
I consider four possibilities.  First, the market may be strong-form efficient and incorporate the 
non-disclosed information fully into stock prices via alternative information channels to public 
disclosure such as insider trading (e.g., Manne 1966).  Second, stock prices may only partially 
reflect non-disclosed information.  In a model without public information (the period of 
nondisclosure in my setting), insiders are predicted to reveal only a portion of their private 
information (Kyle 1985).  Investors may also be able to infer some accounting information from 
comparable firms that do disclose (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2010).  Third, insiders may 
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withhold valuable accounting information and stock prices are not associated with financial 
information.  Finally, managers may not disclose financial statement information because the 
information is not useful for valuation.  Formally, I hypothesize (null form): 
H1: Under the voluntary disclosure regime, stock prices for non-disclosing firms are 
not associated with accounting information. 
 
 It is important to note that OTCBB firms are small with low analyst coverage.  The best 
source of information is the firm itself; the literature on voluntary disclosure documents that 
increased voluntary disclosure benefits firms in low information environments (e.g., Botosan 
1997, Blankespoor et al. 2010).  Compliance with the Eligibility Rule causes a significant shift in 
the amount of financial statement disclosure for non-disclosing firms.  Presumably, the 
imposition of mandatory disclosure should affect these firms the most.  Further, studying the 
effects of mandatory disclosure should enable me to distinguish which of the four possibilities 
motivating Hypothesis 1 is most likely.  This leads to my second hypothesis (null form): 
H2: Mandatory disclosure does not increase the association between stock prices and 
accounting information for non-disclosing firms. 
 
 I also study the disclosing firms.  Mandatory disclosure regulation may not have a 
material direct effect on disclosing firms because they voluntarily provided financial statement 
information in the voluntary regime.  However, voluntary disclosure may not be credible because 
managers have incentives to issue self-serving disclosures.  Voluntary disclosure of bad news is 
likely to be viewed as credible, but investors may be more skeptical of favorable news (e.g., 
Sivakumar and Waymire 1993).  Mandatory disclosure may enable firm managers’ to credibly 
commit to disclose both good and bad news (Verrecchia 2001).  The addition of an audit 
requirement and increased civil liability under the 1934 Act may enhance the credibility of 
reported information as well.  This leads to the following hypotheses (null form): 
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H3a: Under the voluntary disclosure regime, stock prices for disclosing firms are not 
associated with accounting information. 
 
H3b: Mandatory disclosure does not increase the association between stock prices and 
accounting information for disclosing firms. 
 
My research design follows prior research that examines the association of stock prices 
and accounting information (e.g., Francis and Schipper 1999, Ely and Waymire 1999, etc.).  
Specifically I s r o  v  and earnings in the following regression: , regre s stock p ices n book alue
 ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܤ ௜ܸ௧ ൅ ߙଶܧܣܴ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧     (1) 
Where P is the share price six months after the fiscal year-end, BV is the book value per share 
and EARN is earnings per share.  I adjust for stock splits as necessary.  I use the price six months 
after the fiscal year-end to be consistent with how firms are classified as either disclosing or non-
disclosing firms in the voluntary reporting regime.  The operational definition of current 
disclosure in this market was defined by SEC Rule 15c2-11 as six months from a fiscal year-
end.14  Both the coefficients for BV and EARN as well as the adjusted R2 from equation 1 
provide information about how stock prices relate to accounting information.15 
 
4. Data 
 
4.1  Data Collection 
 Table 1 provides the details of my sample based on data obtained from the OTCBB.16  
On January 4, 1999, there were 6,513 securities quoted on the OTCBB.  Of those, 417 securities 
were multiple issues (e.g., Class A and Class B common stock) for the same firm and 283 were  
                                                 
14 Results are similar if I use the price four months after fiscal year-end. 
15 Brown et al. (1999) suggest deflating regression variables by past price to mitigate the effects of scale.  I find 
qualitatively similar results to those presented when I scale by price as of six months after the preceding year-end. 
16 The initial list of securities quoted on the OTCBB on January 4, 1999 is available on the OTCBB website: 
www.otcbb.com.  I then used daily lists of additions, deletions and changes, also available on the website, to 
determine compliance.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
Panel A reconciles the securities listed on the OTCBB on January 4, 1999 to the number of firms 
actually reviewed by the OTCBB for compliance with the Eligibility Rule.  Panel B classifies the 
firms reviewed for compliance as either firms that were already filing with the SEC in 1998 or 
firms that were not filing with the SEC in 1998.  Panel C identifies the non-bank and non-
insurance firms that were not filing with the SEC in 1998, but began filing with the SEC in 
compliance with the Eligibility Rule.  
 
Panel A: Firms Reviewed by OTCBB at Phase-in Date     
Number of securities listed on OTCBB as of 1/4/99     6,513  
Multiple issues for the same firm       (417)
Foreign firms and firms with only warrants or preferred stock on 
OTCBB       (283)
Number of firms with primary issues listed on OTCBB as of 1/4/99     5,813  
Firms leaving OTCBB prior to phase-in date       (411)
Number of firms reviewed by OTCBB at phase-in date     5,402  
      
Panel B: SEC Filing Status of Firms Reviewed by the OTCBB     
Firms reviewed by OTCBB     5,402  
SEC Filers in 1998     1,899  
Non-SEC Filers in 1998     3,503  
      
Panel C: Newly Compliant Firms with Data     
Non-SEC Filers in 1998     3,503  
Noncompliant with Eligibility Rule    (2,677)
Newly Compliant firms        826  
Less banks and insurance firms       (227)
Non-bank and non-insurance firms        599  
Less firms without registration statement or 10-K filing       (198)
Less shell companies       (233)
Less firms with no prior year data in filings         (45)
Newly Compliant firms        123  
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for foreign firms or firms with only warrants or preferred stock.  Of the remaining 5,813 
domestic issuers, 411 firms delisted from the OTCBB prior to their phase-in date for various 
reasons including mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy, failure to comply with Rule 15c, 
inactivity, and listing on NASDAQ or a national exchange. This leaves 5,402 domestic firms that 
the OTCBB reviewed for compliance with the Eligibility Rule.  
 Of the 5,402 firms reviewed by the OTCBB for compliance, 1,899 firms filed with the 
SEC in 1998 while 3,503 firms did not.  Of the Already Compliant firms, 539 firms become 
delinquent in their filings with the SEC or are terminated during 1999.   
 The main sample of interest for my study is the set of firms who were not filing with the 
SEC, but initiate filing with the SEC to comply with the Eligibility Rule. Of the 3,503 firms that 
were not filing with the SEC in 1998, 2,677 firms chose not to comply with the Eligibility Rule, 
leaving 826 Newly Compliant firms.  I exclude banks and insurance companies because they are 
in regulated industries.  This results in 599 Newly Compliant non-bank and non-insurance 
companies. 
 Of these 599 firms, I am unable to locate SEC filings for 198 firms.  Of the remaining 
393 firms’ SEC filings, 233 firms were shell companies.  These represent firms with minimal 
assets and no operations or specific business plan other than to identify suitable acquisitions.  
These companies likely choose to comply with the Eligibility Rule because the cost of 
compliance is low (i.e., minimal audit costs). For 45 firms, the current year of operations 
represented their first year of operations and so no data was available for the prior year.  This 
leaves a final sample of 123 Newly Compliant firms with suitable data. 
 As noted earlier, disclosure of financial statement information prior to the Eligibility Rule 
was not entirely voluntary.  SEC Rule 15c2-11 required firms to provide financial statement 
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information to the initial market maker upon initiating quotation on the OTCBB.  For 30 firms, 
the year of prior period financial statement information that I observe in their SEC filing is the 
same information they would have provided to the market maker at their initial quotation.  I 
exclude these firms leaving a final sample of 93 firms where disclosure of financial statement 
information is voluntary in the period prior to the Eligibility Rule and for which I am able to 
subsequently observe the information these firms would have had to disclose if under SEC 
disclosure during that period.   
Table 2: Newly Compliant Firms’ Disclosure Prior to the Eligibility Rule 
Panel A identifies Newly Compliant firms from Table 1 Panel C where the prior year of financial 
statement information observable in a firm’s first SEC filing was not provided to the initial 
market maker per SEC Rule 15c2-11.  Panel B classifies firms as disclosing if firms publicly 
disclosed financial statement information within six months of their fiscal year-end, and non-
disclosing otherwise. 
 
Panel A: Voluntary vs. Mandatory Disclosing Firms       
Disclosure is voluntary 93 
Disclosure is mandatory per SEC Rule 15c2-11 30 
  123     
Panel B: Voluntary Firms Public Disclosure Choices       
Number Percent 
Non-Disclosing firms 66  71%
Disclosing firms 27  29%
  93    100%
 
 Panel B of Table 2 details that of the 93 firms where disclosure was voluntary prior to the 
Eligibility Rule, 66 (71%) firms chose not to publicly disclose financial statement information 
while 27 (29%) firms publicly disclosed financial statement information.  I classify firms as 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms based on a Lexis-Nexis search using each company’s name.  
I then examined each article to determine whether a company disclosed financial statement 
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information.  I also searched S&P Daily News, a low-cost method commonly used in the OTC 
markets to disseminate financial statement information.  SEC Rule 15c2-11 Paragraph (g)(1) 
defines current financial statement information as six months.  As this was the operational 
definition of “current” in this market, I adopt six months as my cut off for voluntary disclosure.  
Specifically, I classify any firm that publicly disclosed financial statement information within six 
months of its fiscal year-end as a disclosing firm, and as a non-disclosing firm otherwise.  
 I collect financial information from each firm’s SEC filings.  I obtain price data from 
FactSet.  FactSet provides information about dividends and stock splits as well.   
4.2  Disclosure and Firm Characteristics 
In this section, I examine firm characteristics for non-disclosing firms and disclosing 
firms.  Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the 93 firms I study.  The information in the 
Before columns is based on each firm’s final year of information prior to the Eligibility Rule, 
except for the information for DSE, Auditor, GC, and Ownership which are only available for the 
mandatory disclosure period.  The information in After columns is based on each firm’s first year 
of information in the mandatory disclosure regime.  Panels A and B reveal that both the non-
disclosing and disclosing firms are small firms, whether measured by sales, assets or market 
value.  Both non-disclosing and disclosing firms’ operations on average generate negative 
earnings and operating cash flows.  Panels A and B also reveal that the firms do not change 
dramatically after the Eligibility Rule.  The primary exception to this observation is that market 
value roughly triples for non-disclosing firms (significant at the 5% level).  Disclosing firms also 
experience a large increase in market value (median is significant at the 10% level).   
When comparing non-disclosing firms to disclosing firms, unreported tests indicate 
disclosing firms are larger in terms of sales, gross margin, selling, general, and administrative  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics based on each firm’s final year of information in the 
voluntary disclosure period (Before) and each firm’s first year of information in the mandatory 
disclosure period (After).  All variables are in thousands, except for ratios and dummy variables. 
 
Panel A: Non-Disclosing Firms (66 firms)
  Before  After 
Variable Mean Median  Std Dev Mean Median  Std Dev 
Sales 546  51 1,622 698 53  1,704  
GM 207  7 727 267 20  695  
SG&A 625  367 810 916 827  840  ** ## 
R&D 78  0 219 78 0  165  
Earnings (684) (339) 987 (826) (625) 1,081  
Profit 0.11 0.00 0.31  0.14 0.00 0.35 
CFO (391) (180) 557 (389) (328) 721  
Assets 953  259 2,309 1,486 461  2,879  
SE (936) (51) 5,680 (590) 9  6,002  
MV 7,655  3,040 9,134 25,250 9,498  42,036  ** ###
BM -0.35 0.00 1.80 -0.13 0.00 0.73 
ROA -1.41 -0.65 1.92 -1.49 -0.65 2.25 
D-to-A Ratio 1.64 0.85 2.01 1.46 0.84 1.81 
Industry 
Concentration 0.60 0.55 0.26 0.62 0.59 0.25 
DSE 0.47 0.00 0.50 
Auditor 0.05 0.00 0.21 
GC 0.55 1.00 0.50 
Ownership  (%) 51 55 23 
               
***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively (two-tailed).  ###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
GM is Sales minus cost of goods sold.  SG&A is selling, general and administrative expenses.  
R&D is research and development expense.  Earnings is net income.  Profit is one if net income 
is postive, and zero otherwise.  CFO is cash flows from operations.  SE is stockholders' equity.  
MV is market value calculated as price at the fiscal year-end times common shares outstanding.  
BM is stockholders' equity divided by market value.  ROA is net income divided by total assets.  
D-to-A Ratio is total liabilities divided by total assets.  Industry Concentration is the four-firm 
concentration ratio based on 3-digit SIC sales.  DSE is one if the entity is a Development Stage 
Enterprise, and zero otherwise.  Auditor is one if the auditor is a Big N auditor, and zero 
otherwise.  GC is one if the audit opinion is a going concern opinion, and zero otherwise.  
Ownership is the combined ownership of officers and directors and blockholders holding greater 
than 5%. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Disclosing Firms (27 Firms)           
  Before   After 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median  Std Dev 
Sales 5,034  542 12,171 6,389 627  13,560 
GM 1,641  176 3,892 1,851 234  3,713 
SG&A 1,648  1,115 1,891 2,599 1,520  2,950 
R&D 8  0 37 8 0  38 
Earnings (456) (589) 2,098 (2,355) (983) 4,363 * 
Profit 0.17 0.00 0.36 0.17 0.00 0.36
CFO (255) (426) 1,354 (994) (641) 1,894 
Assets 5,650  1,162 10,453 4,890 1,519  8,730 
SE 2,303  284 7,351 2,145 566  7,507 
MV 19,343  12,969 25,621 34,752 23,224  56,223 # 
BM 0.25 0.01 1.15 0.08 0.03 0.23
ROA -0.94 -0.58 1.79 -1.67 -1.00 1.97
D-to-A Ratio 0.71 0.66 0.51 0.93 0.78 1.42
Industry 
Concentration 0.65 0.61 0.23 0.65 0.59 0.23
DSE 0.26 0.00 0.45
Auditor 0.11 0.00 0.32
GC 0.44 0.00 0.51
Ownership  (%) 43 41 26
                
***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively (two-tailed).  ###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
GM is Sales minus cost of goods sold.  SG&A is selling, general and administrative expenses.  
R&D is research and development expense.  Earnings is net income.  Profit is one if net income 
is postive, and zero otherwise.  CFO is cash flows from operations.  SE is stockholders' equity.  
MV is market value calculated as price at the fiscal year-end times common shares outstanding.  
BM is stockholders' equity divided by market value.  ROA is net income divided by total assets.  
D-to-A Ratio is total liabilities divided by total assets.  Industry Concentration is the four-firm 
concentration ratio based on 3-digit SIC sales.  DSE is one if the entity is a Development Stage 
Enterprise, and zero otherwise.  Auditor is one if the auditor is a Big N auditor, and zero 
otherwise.  GC is one if the audit opinion is a going concern opinion, and zero otherwise.  
Ownership is the combined ownership of officers and directors and blockholders holding greater 
than 5%. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Industry Classification          
Non-Disclosing Firms 
(N=66) 
Disclosing Firms 
(N=27) 
Industry (2-Digit SIC Code) # of Firms Percentage # of Firms Percentage 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 1 2% 0  0%
Construction 1 2% 2  7%
Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate 7 11% 2  7%
Manufacturing 19 29% 4  15%
Mining 6 9% 2  7%
Public Administration 1 2% 0  0%
Retail Trade 0 0% 4  15%
Services 20 30% 7  26%
Transportation and Utilities 8 12% 4  15%
Wholesale Trade 3 5% 2  7%
66 100% 27  100%
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expenses, assets, stockholders’ equity, and market value (differences significant at least at the 
5% level).  Non-disclosing firms invest more in research and development, which is consistent 
with a larger portion of the non-disclosing firms being DSEs (47%) than the disclosing firms 
(26%).  SFAS No. 7 classifies a company as a DSE when its efforts are focused on establishing 
new business and either its primary operations have not yet begun, or no significant revenues 
have been earned.  Thus, a significant portion of these firms are start-up companies working on 
implementing their business plan.   
Industry Concentration suggests that the average level of competition in the industries 
non-disclosing and disclosing firms operate in is similar.  I calculate this measure of industry 
concentration following Botosan and Stanford (2005) as the sales of the top four firms relative to 
all firms sales in a 3-digit SIC code for a given year – higher levels of concentration indicate less 
competitive industries.  Ownership, which represents the total ownership of both insiders and 
blockholders with more than 5% ownership of the company, is higher for non-disclosing firms.  
This likely reflects less demand for public disclosure in non-disclosing firms since insiders and 
blockholders own a larger portion of the firm.  Only a small percentage of non-disclosing and 
disclosing firms employs a Big N auditor.  The high incidence of going concern opinions (55% 
and 44% for non-disclosing and disclosing firms, respectively) indicates many firms are 
distressed and in need of additional capital for survival.  Overall, the descriptive statistics paint a 
picture of non-disclosing and disclosing firms as small start-up companies pursuing new business 
ideas in an effort to become profitable.  
 Panel C of Table 3 shows the industry classifications for non-disclosing and disclosing 
firms.  Approximately sixty percent of non-disclosing firms are in either manufacturing or 
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services.  Disclosing firms are in four primary industries: manufacturing, retail trade, services, 
and transportation and utilities.   
 Table 4 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between firms’ disclosure choices 
and proxies for the costs and benefits of disclosure.  The statistically significant positive 
correlation between Disclosure and the existence of research and development activities is 
consistent with firms guarding proprietary information.17  The statistically significant positive 
correlation between size and disclosure is consistent with several interpretations.  One is that 
disclosure costs decrease in firm size due to a fixed component to preparation and dissemination 
of financial statements (King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990). Another is the legal cost hypothesis 
(Skinner 1994) where disclosure increases in firm size because the dollar value of damages in 
securities litigation are a function of firm size.  The statistically significant negative correlation 
between Disclosure and DSE status is consistent with DSE firms not disclosing financial 
statements to equity investors because this information is less useful in valuing these firms than 
non-DSE firms.  The statistically significant negative association between higher ownership 
concentration and Disclosure may reflect lower demand for disclosure due to lower agency costs.   
 I further analyze firms’ disclosure choices in a probit model.  The results are reported in 
Table 5.  Consistent with the Pearson/Spearman correlations, I find a statistically significant 
negative association between voluntarily disclosing financial statements and R&D, DSE, and 
Ownership, and a positive association with Size.  I estimate the marginal effect using the average  
of marginal effects evaluated at each observation, except for dummy variables which are the  
 
17 I use an indicator variable for Profit and R&D because a suitable scalar is not readily available.  Total assets 
suffers from a small denominator problem and many firms do not have sales.  For R&D, I obtain similar results if I 
scale by total expenses. 
   
 
Table 4: Correlations 
This table presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal between Disclose and firm characteristics. 
 
Variable Disclose BM Profit R&D Size DSE Ownership
Industry 
Concentration 
Disclose 1.00 -0.06 0.14 -0.24 0.27 -0.18 -0.17 0.02 
(0.57) (0.19) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.83) 
BM 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.22 -0.27 0.13 0.04 0.11 
(0.20) (1.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.25) (0.72) (0.33) 
Profit 0.14 0.28 1.00 -0.15 -0.15 -0.27 -0.02 0.02 
(0.19) (0.01) (0.17) (0.18) (0.01) (0.87) (0.89) 
R&D -0.24 -0.12 -0.15 1.00 0.03 0.17 -0.12 -0.12 
(0.02) (0.29) (0.17) (0.78) (0.11) (0.29) (0.30) 
Size 0.27 -0.11 -0.07 0.03 1.00 -0.02 -0.18 0.04 
(0.01) (0.33) (0.54) (0.78) (0.87) (0.11) (0.75) 
DSE -0.18 -0.17 -0.27 0.17 0.00 1.00 -0.06 -0.08 
(0.05) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11) (0.99) (0.57) (0.49) 
Ownership -0.19 0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.20 -0.04 1.00 0.05 
(0.04) (0.61) (0.68) (0.70) (0.04) (0.71) (0.68) 
Industry 
Concentration 0.02 0.31 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.08 0.03 1.00 
  (0.86) (0.00) (0.98) (0.32) (1.00) (0.48) (0.79)   
p-values in (italics).  Bold represents significant correlation at least at the 10% significance level (one-tailed test when there is a 
prediction). 
 
Disclose is equal to one if firms voluntarily disclosed financial statement information, and zero otherwise.  BM is the book-to-market 
ratio defined as stockholders' equity divided by the market value of equity.  Profit is equal to one if net income is positive, and zero 
otherwise.  R&D is equal to one if a firm has research and development expenses, and zero otherwise.  Size is the log of market value 
of equity at the beginning of the year.  DSE is one if a firm is a Development Stage Enterprise, and zero otherwise.  Ownership is the 
combined ownership percentage of insiders and blockholders.  Industry Concentration is the four-firm concentration ratio calculated 
as the top four firms' sales in an industry year (3-Digit SIC) divided by total industry sales. 28
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Table 5: Analysis of Firms’ Voluntary Disclosure Choices 
This table presents the results of probit regression of firms' disclosure choices in their final year 
of the voluntary disclosure regime.  The marginal effect is the average marginal effect, computed 
as the mean of marginal effects evaluated at each observation. 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclose 
 
Variable Expectation Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect p-value 
Intercept -4.29 ** 0.02 
BM - 0.07 0.02 0.13 
Profit +/- 0.63 0.19 0.22 
R&D - -0.27 -0.28 *** <0.01 
Size + 0.08 0.08 *** <0.01 
DSE - -0.06 -0.10 * 0.10 
Ownership - -0.32 -0.30 ** 0.04 
Industry Concentration - -0.20 -0.05 0.38 
Likelihood Ratio 12.54 0.08 
Pseudo R2 0.19 
N 93 
            
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (one-tailed tests where 
directional prediction), respectively, based on robust standard errors.  
 
Disclose is equal to one if firms voluntarily disclosed financial statement information, and zero 
otherwise.  BM is the book-to-market ratio defined as stockholders' equity divided by the market 
value of equity.  Profit is equal to one if net income is positive, and zero otherwise.  R&D is 
equal to one if a firm has research and development expenses, and zero otherwise.  Size is the log 
of market value of equity at the beginning of the year.  DSE is one if a firm is a Development 
Stage Enterprise, and zero otherwise.  Ownership is the combined ownership percentage of 
insiders and blockholders.  Industry Concentration is the four-firm concentration ratio calculated 
as the top four firms' sales in an industry year (3-Digit SIC) divided by total industry sales.
 
30 
 
discrete changes in the quantities of interest as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.18  
Marginal effects indicate that a firm with research and development expense is 28% less likely to 
disclose, DSE firms are 10% less likely to disclose, and a unit change in Ownership a 30% lower 
probability of disclosure.  A unit change in Size is associated with an 8% higher likelihood of 
disclosure. 
 
5. Analysis of Stock Prices and Accounting Information 
Column 1 of Table 6 presents results for the regression of stock prices on book value and 
earnings for the non-disclosing firms before and after mandatory SEC disclosure.  In the period 
prior to mandatory disclosure, the coefficients on book value and earnings indicate accounting 
information lacks a strong association with stock prices.  The adjusted R2 of 1% corroborates this 
as well.  Thus, I am unable to reject the null for Hypothesis 1.  In isolation these results are 
difficult to interpret because the weak association could be due to nondisclosure of the 
accounting information or because accounting information is not useful for valuation.  Using the 
period during mandatory disclosure provides insights to the likely answer.   
In the period when public disclosure is mandatory for these firms (Column 2), the 
coefficient on book value is positive and significant at the 5% level (formal tests indicate the 
difference is statistically significant at the 10% level).  The coefficient is larger than one, which 
is consistent with conservative accounting wherein the market values certain expenses, such as 
research and develop expenses and selling expenses, as assets (Hand 2003).  The coefficient on 
earnings is statistically insignificant.  The adjusted R2 increases to 6%, which is a statistically  
  
                                                 
18 Greene (2003, p. 668) states that averaging the individual marginal effects is the preferred method of estimating 
marginal effects for small samples.   
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Table 6: Regression of Price on Book Value and Earnings 
This table presents the results of the following regression for non-disclosing and disclosing firms 
for the periods before and after mandatory SEC disclosure requirements: 
 
Pi,t = α0 + α1BVi,t + α2EARNi,t + εi,t 
 
    Non-Disclosing Firms  Disclosing Firms 
Before After Before After 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.08 *** 1.64 *** 1.63 *** 1.43 *** 
(6.22) (5.10) (3.92) (3.89)
BV 0.16 4.21 ** 2.26 *** 0.87 ** 
(0.67) (2.44) (4.16) (2.36)
EARN -0.30 -0.53 -0.84 0.30
(-0.81) (-0.40) (-0.45) (0.43)
N 87 87 34 34
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.06 0.68 0.28
Z-Statistic: 
1 vs. 2, 3 vs. 4 2.20 ** -3.59 *** 
1 vs. 3, 2 vs. 4             -7.52 *** -3.15 *** 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, based on 
robust standard errors.  t-statistics in (italics).  Z-Statistic based on Cramer (1987). 
 
Before and After represent the periods before and after mandatory SEC disclosure requirements, 
respectively.  Pi,t is the price six months after the fiscal year-end t.  BVi,t is the book value divided 
by the common shares outstanding at fiscal year-end t.  EARNi,t is earnings per share for fiscal 
year-end t. 
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significant increase at the 5% level (-2.20 Z-Statistic).19    Accordingly, I reject the null of 
Hypothesis 2.   
An adjusted R2 of 6% is low for a regression of price on book value and earnings.  In 
economic terms this low association suggests that accounting information is of limited use in 
valuing these firms.  These results appear consistent with mandatory disclosure marginally  
increasing the amount of information in the market.  One interpretation is that these firms did not 
disclose financial statement information prior to mandatory disclosure because the benefits were 
small relative to the perceived costs. 
Column 3 of Table 6 presents results for the regression of stock prices on book values 
and earnings for disclosing firms before and after mandatory SEC disclosure.  The coefficient on 
book value is positive and significant at the 1% level.  As explained above, the coefficient 
greater than one is consistent with conservative accounting.  The coefficient mapping earnings to 
stock prices is statistically insignificant, which is likely due to the high proportion of loss firms 
(Hayn 1995).  The adjusted R2 of 68% indicates that book value explains a large proportion of 
price.  Therefore, I reject the null of Hypothesis 3a.  The statistically significant coefficient on 
book value and the high adjusted R2 are consistent with investors interpreting the voluntary 
disclosures of these firms as value-relevant in the unregulated disclosure environment.  These 
findings, however, do not suggest that all firms would receive similar benefits from voluntarily 
disclosing financial statement information.  The decision to disclose financial statements and any 
                                                 
19 The statistical tests of differences in adjusted R2 are based on Cramer (1987), which assumes asymptotic normal 
distributions.  I perform boot-strap based tests of differences, which do not rely on distributional assumptions.  
These tests reveal some of my results are sensitive to this choice.  Specifically, my boot-strap based tests indicate 
that the difference in adjusted R2 is different between non-disclosing and disclosing firms in the voluntary disclosure 
regime and the mandatory disclosure regime; otherwise, the bootstrap tests indicate the other differences in adjusted 
R2s are not statistically different. 
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resulting differences in association between stock prices and financial statement information are 
determined by firm-specific characteristics of a non-randomly selected group of firms.20 
After mandatory SEC disclosure (Column 4), the coefficient mapping book value to 
prices continues to be positive and significant at the 5% level, but decreases from 2.26 to 0.87 
(difference statistically significant at the 1% level).  The change in the coefficient relating stock 
prices and book values provides evidence of a different relationship, not necessarily a stronger 
one.  The adjusted R2 provides better evidence about the strength of the association between 
stock prices and accounting information.  The adjusted R2 decreases to 28%, a significant drop 
from 68% in the period prior to the Eligibility Rule (statistically significant at the 1% level).  The 
association is still quite strong, though, relative to the adjusted R2 for non-disclosing firms 
(statistically different at the 1% level).   
 I note two main caveats in interpreting my results.  First, I study firms that chose to 
comply with the Eligibility Rule.  I am unable to conduct the same study for the Noncompliant 
firms that choose to leave the OTCBB.  Thus, I identify a local effect that may not generalize to 
a broader cross-section of firms.  Specifically, my results might be different if the firms that 
opted out of complying with the SEC disclosure requirements had instead been forced to comply.  
Second, my sample is small and the low association between stock prices and accounting 
information for non-disclosing firms could be due to insufficient power in my tests.  However, I 
                                                 
20 To mitigate potential bias due to self-selection, in unreported results I adjust for selectivity between disclosing and 
non-disclosing firms by using a first-stage probit model.  This approach is a variant of Heckman’s (1979) two-stage 
technique.  The first-stage probit regression model is the same as in Table 5, where the decision to voluntarily 
disclose financial statement information is a function of growth opportunities (book-to-market ratio), R&D, 
profitability (a dummy if net income is positive, and zero otherwise), size (log of market value at the beginning of 
the year), DSE status, Ownership, and Industry Concentration.  I then calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio, which 
represents the probability of firms choosing to voluntarily disclose financial statement information, and include it in 
my regression of price on book value and earnings both for non-disclosing and disclosing firms.  The results are 
similar to those reported in Table 4. 
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do find a statistically significant association for the disclosing firms where the sample size is less 
than one half of the non-disclosing firms sample. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analyses 
I further evaluate my main results by partitioning non-disclosing firms on DSE status, 
since accounting information should play a more important role in valuation for non-DSE firms.  
I also recognize that my main analysis is a joint test of my hypotheses and the valuation model I 
use.  Since my firms are similar to internet firms in terms of losses, life stage, and capitalization 
in the late 1990s, I follow the literature on the valuation of internet firms (Trueman et al. 2000, 
Rajgopal et al. 2003, Keating et al. 2003) and regress price on book value and the components of 
earnings (e.g., sales, cost of goods sold, R&D expenses, etc.).  This literature argues that the 
components of earnings for internet firms are differentially informative for price.  The results for 
these analyses are presented below. 
6.1  Development Stage Enterprise Partition 
I further examine the non-disclosing firms by partitioning the firms on DSE status.21  
Willenborg (1999) argues from an ex ante perspective, that accounting information a more useful 
role for the valuation of non-DSE firms than for DSE firms.  My intent is to identify non-
disclosing firms where accounting information may play a more important role in valuation, and 
therefore, be associated with price even in the absence of disclosure.  Table 7 presents the 
results.  Consistent with expectations, stock prices of DSE firms exhibit almost no association 
with book value and earnings in either period.  In both periods, the coefficients on book value 
and earnings are insignificant and the adjusted R2 is only 1% (and not statistically different).   
                                                 
21 I also partition disclosing firms on DSE status.  For non-DSE firms, I find similar results to those presented in 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.  For DSE firms, there are only 8 firm-year observations and the estimates are not 
reliable with so few observations. 
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Table 7: Non-Disclosing Firms Partitioned on DSE Status 
This table presents the results of the following regression for non-disclosing partitioned on DSE 
status for the periods before and after mandatory SEC disclosure requirements: 
 
Pi,t = α0 + α1BVi,t + α2EARNi,t + εi,t 
 
    DSE   Non-DSE 
Before After Before After 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.96 *** 1.55 *** 1.28 *** 1.76 *** 
(4.14) (3.37) (4.84) (3.73)
BV -0.02 2.72 1.30 ** 4.37 ** 
(-0.20) (1.31) (2.06) (2.44)
EARN -0.28 0.34 -0.44 -1.21
(-0.59) (0.25) (-0.71) (-0.52)
N 43 43 44 44
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.08
Z-Statistic: 
1 vs. 2, 3 vs. 
4 0.10 0.24
1 vs. 3, 2 vs. 
4             -1.75 * 1.90 * 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, based on 
robust standard errors.  t-statistics in (italics).  Z-Statistic based on Cramer (1987). 
 
DSE stands for Development Stage Enterprise.  Before and After represent the periods before 
and after mandatory SEC disclosure requirements, respectively.  Pi,t is the price six months after 
the fiscal year-end t.  BVi,t is the book value divided by the common shares outstanding at fiscal 
year-end t.  EARNi,t is earnings per share for fiscal year-end t. 
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In contrast, stock prices of non-DSE firms exhibit a low association with book value and 
earnings both before and after mandatory disclosure with adjusted R2s of 7% and 8%, 
respectively (that are not statistically different).  The significant association in the prior period 
provides evidence that stock prices do reflect non-disclosed accounting information.  In fact, the 
association between non-disclosed accounting information and stock prices in the prior period 
(adjusted R2 is 7%) is as strong as the association between disclosed accounting information and 
stock prices in the period of mandatory disclosure (adjusted R2 is 8%).  The low adjusted R2 
indicates accounting information plays a minimal role in valuation for these companies.  The 
coefficient relating book value to stock prices does increase, but this only provides evidence of a 
different relationship, not necessarily a stronger one.  Even after partitioning the non-disclosing  
firms to identify firms where accounting information is likely to play a more significant role, the 
evidence still suggests that accounting information only plays a modest role in valuation for non-
disclosing firms.  I tentatively conclude that firms did not disclose this information in the prior 
period because it was not particularly beneficial to do so.  Further, it appears that stock prices do 
incorporate financial statement information even in the absence of disclosure.  
6.2 Analysis of the Components of Earnings 
 The literature examining the valuation of internet companies finds a weak association 
between price and earnings (Trueman et al. 2000, Rajgopal et al. 2003, Keating et al. 2003, Hand 
2003).  However, these studies find that the components of earnings are strongly correlated with 
price.  For example, Trueman et al. (2000) examine 217 firm-quarters for 63 internet firms and 
find an adjusted R2 of 0% in a regression of market value on earnings.  In a regression of market 
value on the components of earnings (gross profit, marketing expenses, R&D expense, and other 
expenses), they find an adjusted R2 of 52%.   
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Following this literature, I regress price on book value, gross profit, R&D expense, and 
selling, general and administrative expenses.  The tenor of the untabulated results is similar to 
the regression of price on book value and earnings (i.e., very similar adjusted R2s).  Of particular 
interest, I do not find a statistically significant association between price and research and 
development expenses.  I also partition gross profit into sales and cost of goods sold.  Sales is 
arguably more observable to the market than costs for non-disclosing firms.  I do not find a 
statistically significant association between price and sales.  This analysis suggests my main 
results are not driven by the valuation model. 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
I examine the role of accounting information in capital markets under voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure regimes for a sample of firms traded on the OTCBB.  For the set of firms 
begin filing periodic reports with the SEC under the 1934 Act to comply with the Eligibility 
Rule, I observe at least one prior year of accounting information in their initial SEC filings.  This 
enables me to observe the accounting information that non-disclosing firms previously withheld.   
In the voluntary disclosure period, I first examine firm characteristics associated with 
voluntary disclosure.  I find firms’ disclosure choices are negatively related to research and 
development activities, Development Stage Enterprise (DSE) firms22, and ownership 
concentration.  These results are consistent with firms guarding proprietary information, not 
disclosing when accounting information is less useful in valuation, and not disclosing when 
agency costs are likely lower.  I also find that firms’ disclosure choices are positively associated 
                                                 
22 DSE are firms that in the process of commencing operations and have little to no revenues.  Relative to non-DSE 
firms, DSE firms are valued almost entirely based on a growth option where accounting information is less likely to 
be useful in valuing these firms. 
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with size, which is consistent with high firm size resulting in decreasing costs to disclosure, 
greater returns to information acquisition, and/or increased litigation risk.   
Second, I examine how disclosure versus non-disclosure of accounting information 
impacts its association with stock prices in the voluntary disclosure regime.  I find evidence 
consistent with firms voluntarily disclosing financial statement information when it is useful for 
valuation and not disclosing that information otherwise.  Specifically, accounting information 
and stock prices are weakly associated both before and after mandatory regulation for non-
disclosing firms.  In contrast, stock prices are strongly associated with accounting information 
before and after mandatory disclosure regulation for disclosing firms.  I find some evidence that 
the association between stock prices and accounting information increases after mandatory SEC 
disclosure requirements for non-disclosing firms.   
I find evidence that non-disclosed accounting information is incorporated into stock 
prices when I partition firms on DSE status.  For non-DSE (firms where accounting information 
is likely more useful for valuation), I find a similar association both before and after mandatory 
disclosure regulation.  This is consistent with stock prices reflecting accounting information even 
though the information was not publicly disclosed. 
This study focuses on one aspect of the impact of mandatory disclosure regulation – the 
relationship between stock prices and accounting information.  I focus on financial statement 
information because the lack of reliable and current financial information about issuers was the 
main justification cited by the SEC in approving the Eligibility Rule.  Future research might 
examine whether my results are robust to the inclusion of banks and insurance companies, which 
largely began filing with their respective industry regulatory authorities rather than the SEC.  
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Future research might also examine the value relevance of accounting information for DSEs 
more generally using a broader sample of firms.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Earnings Quality and Legal Origin: Evidence from Quebec 
     Introduction 
A number of papers document a link between a country’s legal environment and firms’ 
financial reporting outcomes.  For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) document country-level association between countries’ legal origin and the firms’ 
average disclosures.23  This line of research designates France as a civil law country while both 
the United States and Canada are common law countries.  While common law prevails at the 
federal level, one US state has French legal origin, Louisiana.  Similarly, while common law 
prevails at the country level, one Canadian province has French legal origin, Quebec.  The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission requires what firms must register their securities.24  While 
securities regulation also arises in parallel at the state level, this is largely viewed as coordinated 
and subsumed by federal regulation.  U.S. companies incorporate in a state and the majority 
chooses Delaware.  While Canada has securities regulation at the country level, each province 
has its own securities regulator that maintains a larger degree of autonomy.  Canadian companies 
face a choice in that they can either incorporate under the country-level Canada Business 
Corporations Act (CBCA) or at the province level under the Quebec Companies Act (QCA).  
One possible benefit of the Canadian regulatory system is that competition among standard 
setters can be beneficial and may lead to innovation in the legal environment and enforcement.  
However, one potential cost arises from differential enforcement across provinces or different 
                                                 
23 See also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), Bushman and Smith 
(2001), Hope (2003), Leuz, Nanda and Wysocky (2003). 
24 Under U.S. Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. 
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financial reporting incentives leads to heterogeneity and non-comparability in the reported 
Canadian GAAP numbers. 
This paper exploits the unique aspects of Canadian incorporation and securities 
regulation to investigate the effect of incorporation and legal origin on financial reporting 
outcomes.  First, we provide preliminary evidence on the firm characteristics that lead to 
incorporation decisions.  Specifically, we investigate whether firms headquartered in the French 
legal origin province Quebec incorporate under CBCA or QCA.  In as similar vein, we 
investigate whether firms based in a common legal province CBCA or the securities act of its 
province.  Since the interpretation and enforcement of CBCA may differ across provinces, we 
also test for the effect of incorporation comparing Quebec to non-Quebec based firms. 
Second, we investigate whether Canadian firms’ earnings quality varies with legal origin 
or with level of incorporation.  To proxy for earnings quality, we use the earnings attributes that 
are common in the accounting literature.  Overall, our evidence suggests that earnings attributes 
do vary with legal origin (civil vs. common law). 
Currently, Canadian firms report under either Canadian GAAP, IFRS, or US GAAP.  
First, the majority of publicly traded firms currently prepare audited financial statement under 
Canadian GAAP.  Second, Canadian standard setters have announced a commitment to switch to 
IFRS effective for fiscal years or quarters starting after January 1, 2012.  Early adoption is 
permitted and encouraged, yet only a handful of firms have exercised that option.  Further, since 
Canadian GAAP and US GAAP are perceived as very similar accounting standards, Canadian 
firms are permitted to report using US GAAP.  In fact, the US SEC does not require 
reconciliation from Canadian GAAP to US GAAP under the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure 
System.  This exemption from reconciliation will continue once Canadian firms adopt IFRS, 
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since IFRS filers from other countries are also exempt from reconciliation to US GAAP.  
Nevertheless, some Canadian firms voluntarily provide reconciliation.   
All firms included in this study disclose using Canadian GAAP.  Hence, any differences 
that we find in earnings attributes are not attributable to accounting standards.  Instead such 
differences are likely attributable to differences in financial reporting incentives faced by 
financial statement preparers and users.  For example, audit quality may be lower for Quebec 
firms relative to non-Quebec firms. 
The variation in earnings attributes that we document is of interest to financial statement 
users.  Further, our results are also of interest to regulators who require or permit different levels 
of registration.  Allowing heterogeneous incorporation procedures, as does Canada, need not be 
detrimental to investors.  The reason is that it is possible that incorporation is a signaling 
mechanism through which firm managers communicate information. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 gives the institutional background on Canada.  
Section 2 offers a literature review.  Section 3 describes the common earnings attributes used in 
the accounting literature.  Section 4 describes the data collection.  Section 5 summarizes our 
findings for Canada regarding the choice of where to incorporate.  Section 6 analyzes the 
earnings attributes for Canadian firms.  Section 7 concludes and offers suggestions for future 
research.  The (now untabulated) appendix analyzes earnings attributes for US firms comparing 
those based in Louisiana to similar firms based outside Louisiana. 
 
1. Background on Canadian Securities Legislation 
Like the other provinces in Canada, two corporate statues coexist in Quebec, one federal 
and one provincial: the CBCA enacted by the federal Parliament, and the QCA enacted by the 
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National Assembly of Quebec.  Unlike the other provinces in Canada where the provincial 
statues closely mirror the CBCA, the differences between the CBCA and the QCA are significant 
along a number of important dimensions (Daniels, 1991; Bozec, Rousseau, and Laurin, 2008).25  
The primary differences between the QCA and CBCA pertain to minority shareholder rights, 
director and officer liability, and mergers.  Significant differences in minority shareholder rights 
between the QCA and the CBCA include: the lack of an oppression remedy in the QCA, which 
under the CBCA allows security holders, creditors, directors or officers the right to apply to the 
court when the business or the affairs of the corporation are conducted or the directors’ powers 
are being exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial; lesser rights with 
respect to shareholder meetings and voting under the QCA, particularly when enacting 
fundamental changes to the business; and the right of dissent where under the CBCA a 
shareholder may compel the corporation to buy her shares at fair value in the case of a 
fundamental change.  The QCA also differs from the CBCA with respect to the duties and 
liabilities of directors.  The QCA does not specifically require directors to act in the best interest 
of the corporation or to disclose special interests.  Directors are not formally allowed the 
defenses of reasonable prudence and diligence (though Quebec jurisprudence recognizes this to a 
certain extent) and must cover their own expenses in any investigative proceeding against 
them.26 One last major difference between the QCA and CBCA is that the QCA allows mergers 
only between companies governed by certain sections of the QCA, whereas, the CBCA is much 
                                                 
25 We note that although the provincial corporate statutes in the rest of Canada are similar to the CBCA, the level 
and quality of enforcement of these statutes may differ from the enforcement of the CBCA. Thus, in our research 
design we do not treat the rest of Canada uniformly; we distinguish between firms incorporated at the province level 
and federal level for the rest of Canada as well as in Quebec. 
26 See Core (1997) for an analysis of the determinants of Canadian firms’ decision to offer and purchase directors 
and officers insurance from a third party. 
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more flexible with respect to mergers and the incorporation statutes of the amalgamating 
companies.   
In an effort to improve the competiveness of Quebec corporations and facilitate economic 
development in 2009 the Parliament of Quebec passed Bill 63, “Business Corporations Act” 
(Technical Paper 2009), which will replace the QCA in 2011.  Bill 63 represents the first 
substantial reform of Quebec corporate law in nearly thirty years and aims to modernize Quebec 
corporate law.  The Bill was developed in response to a general consensus that the QCA 
inadequately addresses the needs of businesses and fails to provide an efficient operating 
framework for business.  A substantial number of Quebec companies were choosing to 
incorporate under the CBCA, a fact that the Quebec Minister of Finance cites as a primary 
motivation for the Bill.  Essentially, the Bill harmonizes Quebec’s corporate laws with the other 
provinces and the CBCA.  Significant changes in the Bill include: increased minority shareholder 
rights including an oppression remedy and right of dissent; indemnification of directors; 
directors’ duty to disclose conflicts of interest; and relaxation of the restrictive requirements 
governing mergers.   
 
2. Literature Review 
In an influential paper, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue 
that a country’s legal origin affects various accounting, finance and corporate governance 
outcomes for firms in that country.  They document cross-country variation in firms’ average 
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disclosures with the legal origin.27  Specifically, they find that firms in countries with a civil law 
legal origin provide less disclosure.   
Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) further the examination of a country’s legal origin and 
accounting outcomes.  They note that the origins and focus of common law is fundamentally 
different from civil law.  Common law develops from individual action in the private sector and 
stresses legal procedure over rules where private enforcement plays a prominent role in resolving 
disputes between parties.  Thus, the evolution of common law has focused on meeting the 
demands of contracting in markets.  Ball et al. (2000) argue that accounting standards, like 
common law, arose from demands of contracting in markets rather than the government.  They 
note that the dominant form of corporate governance is the ‘shareholder’ model in common law 
countries, where only shareholders elect board members.  In contrast, the ‘stakeholder’ model is 
the dominant form of corporate governance in civil law countries where primary contracting 
parties (e.g., lenders and employees) typically have board representation.  As such, Ball et al. 
(2000) argue that timely accounting income plays a greater role in resolving information 
asymmetry between contracting parties in common law countries than civil law countries 
because these parties operate at greater ‘arm’s length’ from the firm. 
Ball et al. (2000) note that civil law arises from collective planning in the public sector.  
Governmental bodies, not an accounting market, establish accounting standards and are 
responsible for enforcing these standards.  As noted above, the ‘stakeholder’ model is the 
common form of corporate governance in civil law countries.  For example, in Germany 
employees elect 50% of the supervisory board in German stock corporations.  Banks exert 
significant control by voting on behalf of non-voting individual investors whose shares are 
                                                 
27 See also Bushman and Smith (2001), Hope (2003), Leuz, Nanda and Wysocky (2003), and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
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deposited with the banks.  In these countries, firms maintain close relations with their primary 
contracting parties (i.e., debt holders, employees, customers and suppliers).  Ball et al. (2000) 
argue that a natural consequence of this is that financial reporting plays less of a role in resolving 
information asymmetry between managers and financial statement users.  They contend that the 
primary demand from the stakeholder model is for smooth income so as to reduce volatility of 
payouts to the various stakeholders of the firm.   
Empirically, Ball et al. (2000) study four common law countries – Australia, Canada, the 
UK, and the US – and three code law countries – France, Germany, and Japan – and find that 
accounting income incorporates economic income in a more timely manner in common law 
countries than in civil law countries.  Following Basu (1997), their evidence is based on the R2 
from cross-sectional pooled regressions of earnings on returns, a dummy for negative returns and 
the interaction of these two variables.  Related work by Guenther and Young (2000) provides 
similar evidence via a different empirical specification.  Guenther and Young find that aggregate 
earnings are more highly correlated with real economic activity (such as, GDP) in common law 
countries (the UK and US) than in civil law countries (France, Germany, and Japan).   
The subsequent literature on earnings attributes and legal origin expands the list of 
earnings attributes and institutional features studied.  Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) classify 
31 countries via cluster analysis and find three distinct clusters: (1) outsider economies with 
large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights, and strong legal enforcement; 
(2) insider economies with less-developed stock markets, concentrated ownership, but strong 
legal enforcement; and, (3) insider economies with weak legal enforcement.  They observe that 
these clusters closely reflect the partition achieved using common law (1) and civil law (2,3).  
They argue that the private benefits of managing earnings are greater in countries with weaker 
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outside investor rights and weaker legal enforcement.  Using an aggregate measure of four 
proxies for earnings management, they find evidence consistent with their prediction. 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine the institutional structure of countries in detail to 
understand how they shape the demand for accounting conservatism.  Specifically, they examine 
the following institutions: legal/judicial systems, the securities laws focusing on private versus 
public enforcement of these laws, the level of state involvement in the economy, and tax 
regimes.  They find that these institutions shape managers’ incentives to provide conservative 
accounting.   
Recent work by Barton, Hansen and Pownall (2010) examines eight attributes commonly 
used to assess earnings quality in a cross-country study to determine which performance 
measures (i.e., sales, earnings, comprehensive income, and operating cash flows) investors 
appear to value most in each country.  They find that performance measures towards the middle 
of the income statement (such as operating income) are more value relevant, but that this is less 
prevalent for firms in common law countries.  In terms of attributes, performance measures that 
are smoother, more predictable and persistent, and less conservative reduce the value relevance 
of the performance measure and are less useful for valuation.  In contrast, performance measures 
that are closer to current period cash flows, better predict next period’s cash flows, and the 
timeliness in capturing bad news are more value relevant.  These rankings are similar across 
common and civil law countries.   
 
3. Earnings Attributes 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2004), henceforth FLOS, note the absence of one 
universally recognized measure of earnings quality and therefore employ multiple earnings 
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attributes as constructs that are commonly argued in prior literature to represent earnings quality.  
They classify their earnings attributes into two categories, intrinsic and extrinsic, where the 
former (latter) measures earnings attributes without (with) reference to stock market reaction.  
We compare firms’ earnings quality for each of these earnings attributes as defined below. 
3.1  Intrinsic Earnings Attributes 
FLOS identify four intrinsic earnings attributes, Accrual Quality, Earnings Persistence, 
Earnings Predictability, and Earnings Smoothness. 
Accrual Quality 
 While Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005) present evidence that less reliable 
accruals are associated with lower earnings persistence, FLOS provide evidence that firms’ costs 
of debt and equity vary with accrual quality.  Following FLOS, we use the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) measure of accrual quality.  Dechow and Dichev begin with the observation that accruals 
shift the recognition of cash flows over time so that the adjusted numbers (earnings) better 
measure firm performance than cash flows.  The inherent trade-off in the use of accruals is the 
use of assumptions and estimates that when wrong, must be adjusted in future accruals and 
earnings.  These estimation errors and their subsequent corrections are noise that reduces the 
value of accruals.  Thus, Dechow and Dichev argue that the quality of accruals and earnings is 
decreasing in the magnitude of accrual estimation errors.  Operationally, the rationale behind this 
measure is that non-discretionary current accruals in a period are expected to relate to cash 
receipts and disbursements from the previous, current and subsequent reporting period.  The 
discretionary part of current accruals is therefore estimated as the residual (ε) from the following 
regression:  
tj
tj
tj
j
tj
tj
j
tj
tj
jj
tj
tj
Assets
CFO
Assets
CFO
Assets
CFO
Assets
TCA
,
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,
, εδδδδ ++++= +−  (1) 
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where TCA is the firm’s total current accruals measured as (ΔCA – ΔCL – ΔCash + ΔSTDEBT), 
CA is current assets, CL is current liabilities and STDEBT is debt in current liabilities, CFO is 
cash flow from operations from the statement of cash flows, and Assets is the firm’s total assets 
at the end of the annual period.  The standard deviation of the residuals (ε) from equation (1) is 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of Accrual Quality.  Large (small) values of Accrual 
Quality relate to poor (good) quality. 
Earnings Persistence 
The Hicksian income concept suggests that earnings should measure permanent income.  
From that perspective, prior research argued that earnings with large transitory components are 
likely to exhibit lower persistence and, hence, also be of lower quality.  As is standard, we 
measure persistence as the slope coefficient in the regression of current earnings on lagged 
earnings, that is, 
tjtjjjtj XX ,1,,1,0, εφφ ++= −        (2) 
where  is firm j’s annual split-adjusted earnings per share for period t (measured as firm j’s 
net income before extraordinary items divided by the weighted average number of outstanding 
shares) and the coefficient 
tjX ,
j,1φ  is the measure of Persistence.  Larger values of j,1φ  indicate more 
permanent earnings while lower values of j,1φ  indicate more transitory earnings. 
Earnings Predictability 
Following Lipe (1990), among others, earnings predictability is the ability to predict 
earnings based on its past value.  Predictability is valued by security analysts and useful in 
security valuation (e.g., AIMR 1993; Lee 1999).  Further, standard setters list predictability as 
one of three primary elements underlying relevance (FASB 1980).  Following Lipe (1990) and 
Francis et al. (2004), we therefore measure Predictability as the standard deviation of the 
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residuals in equation (2).  Larger (smaller) values of Predictability relate to less (more) 
predictable earnings. 
Earnings Smoothness 
Several prior papers suggest that smoothness in earnings is a desirable quality.  Trueman 
and Titman (1988) propose that by smoothing income managers might be able to affect 
investors’ perceptions about the volatility of the underlying earnings process, thereby decreasing 
the firm’s cost of borrowing and improving its terms of trade with other parties.  Goel and 
Thakor (2003) model a setting where smoothing encourages entry by uninformed investors, who 
would otherwise stay out of the market.  Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find that smoothing 
increases the informativeness of earnings.  Subramanyam (1996) suggests that smoothing 
improves the persistence and predictability of reported earnings.  Similar to Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki (2003) and Francis et al. (2004), we measure smoothness of earnings relative to that of 
cash flow from operations.  Smoothness is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of 
income before extraordinary items to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations.  
Larger values of Smoothness indicate less smooth earnings. 
3.2  Extrinsic Earnings Attributes 
Value Relevance of Earnings 
As in FLOS, value relevance measures the statistical association between accounting 
information and long-window returns.  This view of value relevance allows for the possibility 
that earnings is not the source of information used by market participants, but is only correlated 
with information used by investors.  Viewed this way, value relevance measures the ability of 
earnings to capture or summarize information that affects stock returns.  Empirically, we 
measure value relevance as the ability of levels and changes in earnings to explain returns over 
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the 12-month period beginning three months after the start of the annual period and ending three 
months after the end of the annual period.  Specifically we use the R2 from the following 
regression for each firm and each annual period as our measure of value relevance, Relevance. 
tjtjjtjjjtj EARNEARNRET ,,,2,,1,0, εγγγ +Δ++=     (4) 
where RETj,t  is firm j’s 12-month return beginning three months after the start of fiscal period t 
and ending three months after the end of fiscal period t as firms are required to file their annual 
report with SEDAR within three months of year-end, EARNj,t is firm j’s income before 
extraordinary items in year t, scaled by market value at end of annual period t-1, and ΔEARNj,t  
is change in firm j’s income before extraordinary items in annual period t, scaled by market 
value at end of annual period t-1.  Larger values of Relevance indicate more value relevant 
earnings. 
Timeliness of Earnings 
Following Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) and 
Francis et al. (2004) our measure of timeliness of earnings is the R2  from the reverse regression 
of earnings on returns which was first used in Basu (1997).  The R2 from the reverse regression is 
intended to capture how timely earnings are in reporting concurrently available good and bad 
news.  The regression is as follows: 
tjtjtjjtjjtjjjtj RETNEGRETNEGEARN ,,,,2,,1,,1,0, εββαα +•+++=  (5) 
where NEGj,t = 1 if RETj,t < 0 and 0 otherwise and other variables are as defined previously.  
Larger values of Timeliness imply that earnings concurrently report available good and bad 
news.   
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Earnings Conservatism 
Watts (2003a, 2003b) argues that conservatism in earnings is a desirable property.  Kim 
and Kross (2005) suggest that increasing accounting conservatism plays a role in the greater 
ability of earnings to predict future cash flows in recent years.  Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang 
(2007) argue that conservative accounting may curbs earnings management because under 
conservative accounting lower earnings are less likely due to subpar economic performance and 
more likely due to conservative accounting rules hence lowering managers incentives to increase 
income through earnings management.  We measure Conservatism based on the coefficient on 
the interaction term in equation (5), ߚଶ,௝.28  Larger values of ߚଶ,௝ imply greater conservatism.   
 
     4.  Data 
To identify our sample, we first identified Canadian firms with at least one fiscal year 
ending between January 1997 and November 2009 on the Compustat Xpressfeed North America 
database.  For these firms, we obtain all necessary financial statement information for all 
available firm-years (i.e., we include firm-years prior to 1997).  We require a firm to have at 
least one fiscal year ending in January 1997 or later to ensure that we can obtain incorporation 
information from SEDAR, which provides Canadian public filings back to January 1997.29 For 
each firm in our sample, we collect its incorporation history from the Annual Information Form 
filed on SEDAR, or the other appropriate filing in the event a company is exempt from filing an 
                                                 
28 We note that US studies (e.g., Basu 1997, Pope and Walker 1999, Givoly and Hayn 2000 and Francis et al. 2004) 
typically measure conservatism as the ratio of bad news to good news with ሺߚଵ,௝ ൅ ߚଶ,௝ሻ/ߚଵ,௝. However, as with 
cross-country studies examining Canada (e.g., Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000, Bushman and Piotroski, 2006) ߚଵ,௝ is 
very small and negative, making interpreting the ratio of good news to bad news unreliable. As such, we focus on 
ߚଶ,௝ as our measure of conservatism. We note that this measure of conservatism has been criticized in some recent 
papers including Dietrich, Muller and Riedl (2007), Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan (2007), and Patatoukas and Thomas 
(2010) as not always capturing conservatism. 
29 SEDAR in Canada is analogous to EDGAR in the US and is available at: www.sedar.com. 
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Annual Information Form.  To construct annual returns, we obtain monthly returns data from the 
monthly security file on Compustat.  We exclude firms in the financial or utilities industries 
(two-digit NAICS codes 52 and 22, respectively).  The number of firms meeting these 
requirements is 1,397. 
For our analysis of earnings attributes, we require that data on all seven attributes are 
available for each firm-year to mitigate concerns that differences in sample composition affect 
comparisons across attributes.  We also exclude firms filing with the SEC or using US GAAP.  
US GAAP and Canadian GAAP are viewed as similar by regulators, as evidenced by the absence 
of a mandatory disclosure requirement of reconciliation of accounting differences under the 
Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS).  Foreign private issuers in the US, that is non-
US-based firms, that report under the accounting standards of their home country were required 
to explain to investors what their accounting income and shareholders' equity would have been 
under US GAAP.  Since US GAAP and Canadian GAAP are similar, MJDS specifically 
exempted Canadian firms that report under Canadian GAAP and list in the US from having to do 
this reconciliation.  This means that Canadian firms are permitted to report under either US 
GAAP or Canadian GAAP (some Canadian firms voluntarily report under both).  Recently, the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission exempted non-US-based firms that report under IFRS 
from reconciliation.  As Canadian firms switch to IFRS, they will maintain the exemption from 
reconciliation requirements. 
Notwithstanding the previous arguments, some differences in accounting rules between 
US GAAP and Canadian GAAP persisted during our sample period.  Bandyopadhyay, Hanna, 
and Richardson (1994) investigate a sample of firms that were listed both on Toronto and a U.S. 
stock exchange between 1983 and 1989.  Overall, they find that earnings scaled by market 
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capitalization are 2% lower under US GAAP than Canadian GAAP.  Some of the main source of 
differences in accounting rules pertain to foreign exchange gains or losses on foreign long-term 
debt, early extinguishment of debt, extraordinary items, and interest capitalization of self-
constructed assets [see Table 1 on page 265].  In our analyses below, we exclude US GAAP 
reporting Canadian firms and compare only firms that report audited Canadian GAAP 
statements.  To the extent that differences in accounting standards are industry specific, our 
matching on industry mitigates this concern.  After matching based on the procedures described 
below, our sample of Quebec firms comprises 738 firm-year observations for 167 firms (102 
firms incorporate under the CBCA and 65 firms incorporate under the QCA). 
Following prior research, we employ a matched sample to examine earnings attributes 
(Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 
2008).  Specifically, we match Quebec firms with non-Quebec firms on the level of 
incorporation (federal or provincial), size, and industry.  First, matching on level of incorporation 
allows us to compare firms that made similar decisions regarding where to incorporate.  
Differences in earnings attributes among firms that incorporate under CBCA but are located in 
different provinces may persist, however, due to differences in enforcement between securities 
regulators in different provinces.  Second, matching on size is intended to control for size-related 
differences such as the information environment.  Third, matching on industry is intended to 
control for differences in earnings attributes that vary by industry.   
We match the final year of each Quebec firm with a non-Quebec firm in the same year, 
same industry, and closest in market value without replacement.  If a match is not found for a 
firm, we try to match prior years of the Quebec firm with a non-Quebec firm in the same year, 
same industry and closest in size.  We then retain all overlapping firm years for the Quebec firms 
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and their matched non-Quebec firms.  For example, if a Quebec firm has data from 1998 through 
2007 and its matched non-Quebec firm has data from 2000 through 2008, we retain only data 
from 2000 through 2007 for both the Quebec firm and its matched non-Quebec firm.   
     
 5.  Choice Between Federal and Provincial Incorporation 
We formally examine firms’ decisions to incorporate at the federal or provincial level to 
understand the decision and ensure our research design analyzing earnings attributes controls for 
any systematic differences across provinces.  Since the incorporation decision is a relatively 
permanent decision, we retain only the final firm-year for each firm in our sample and examine 
whether the choice is associated with several important firm characteristics.30,31  Our final 
sample consists of 1,397 firms.  Panel A in table 1 indicates that a vast majority (96%) of firms 
are located in four provinces: Ontario (34%), Alberta (27%), British Columbia (19%), and 
Quebec (16%).  It is also clear that a much larger proportion of Quebec firms incorporate under 
the CBCA relative to other provinces consistent with the Quebec Minister of Finance’s concerns 
about the competiveness of the QCA.  Panel B in table 1 shows significant industry 
concentration in the Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction industry (35%) as well as 
industry concentration in the Manufacturing industry (31%).  Based on panels A and B, we focus 
our analysis on these four provinces and include industry fixed effects in our analysis. 
We performed a thorough review of reasons cited for incorporating either at the federal or 
provincial to examine in our analysis.  The only consistent reason given is that firms operating 
across Canada or internationally are more likely to incorporate at the federal level (Carnaghan 
                                                 
30 Approximately 5% of firms in our sample switch from provincial to federal incorporation and less than 0.01% 
switch from federal to provincial incorporation. 
31 Using the first firm-year for each firm year yields similar results. The first firm-year may better capture firm 
characteristics at the time the firm made its decision regarding where to incorporate. 
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and Gunz, 2007).  Accordingly, we include size in our analysis.  We also note that in Quebec 
mergers are supposedly easier to complete under the CBCA than under the QCA (Cloutier, 
2009).  We include intangible assets to capture a firms tendency engage in mergers as accounting 
rules only allow purchased intangibles to be recorded and mergers are typically when most 
intangibles are recorded.  In addition to size and intangible assets, we also examine whether 
leverage, growth, filing status with the SEC, and auditor are associated with firms’ decisions to 
incorporate at the federal or provincial level.32  Panel C provides descriptive statistics for these 
variables and indicates that Quebec and non-Quebec firms are relatively similar in terms of size 
and leverage.  Many more Quebec firms file under the CBCA than non-Quebec firms, while 
more non-Quebec firms file with the SEC and employ BigN auditors.   
W  t a  de employ the following logistic regression o an lyze the ecision: 
ܥܤܥܣ௜௧ ൌ  ߙ଴ ௧ ݁ ൅ ߙ ܾ݈݊݃݅݁ݏ௜௧ ൅ ߙଵܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߙଶܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃ ௜௧ ଷܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௧ ൅ ߙସܫ݊ݐܽ
൅ߙହܵܧܥ ܨ݈݅݁ݎ௜௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܣݑ݀݅ݐ݋ݎ௜௧ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
  
                                                 
32 In untabulated results, we proxy for growth opportunities by including the book-to-market ratio which is not 
statistically significantly related to firms’ incorporation decisions. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision 
The sample for the analysis of firms’ incorporation decisions consists of the last year each firm in our 
sample reports to System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) between January 1, 
1997 and November 30, 2009.  SEDAR data is not available prior to January 1, 1997 and Compustat data 
was not available after November 30, 2009 at the time we began our study.  This results in a final sample 
of 1,397 firms. 
 
Panel A: Province Breakdown 
 
Province 
Number of 
Firms 
Percentage of 
Firms 
Number of 
CBCA Firms 
Percentage 
CBCA Firms 
Alberta 382 27% 52 14%
British Columbia 267 19% 66 25%
Ontario 473 34% 171 36%
Quebec 226 16% 147 65%
Other Provinces 49 4% 25 51%
Total  1,397 100% 461 
A firm’s province is determined by the location of its headquarters. Other Provinces includes Manitoba, 
New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. CBCA 
represents firms that incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, the federal 
incorporation statute in Canada. 
 
Panel B: Industry Breakdown 
 
NAICS Industry Classification (Two-
Digit) 
Number of 
Firms 
Percentage of 
Firms 
Number of 
CBCA Firms 
Percentage 
CBCA Firms 
Information                                                     154 11% 65 42%
Manufacturing 443 31% 193 44%
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas 
Extraction                                    
487 35% 88 18%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services                                  
67 5% 24 36%
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing                42 3% 10 24%
Retail Trade                                                     41 3% 20 49%
Wholesale Trade                                             36 3% 16 44%
Other Industries 127 9% 45 35%
Total 1,397 100% 461 
Other Industries consists of industries individually representing less than 3% of the sample. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel C: Variables Used in Analysis of Incorporation Decision 
 Quebec (N = 226)  Non-Quebec (N = 1,171)  All Firms (N = 1,397) 
 
Variables 
 
Mea
n 
 
Media
n 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
  
Mea
n 
 
Media
n 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
Size 4.92 4.78 2.22 4.62* 4.65 2.24 4.67 4.66 2.24
Leverage 0.28 0.21 0.42 0.55 0.18 5.29 0.51 0.19 4.84
Growth 0.57 0.04 6.63 0.80 0.11##
# 
6.46 0.77 0.08 6.49
Intangible
s 
0.16 0.05 0.21 0.08**
* 
0.00##
# 
0.15 0.09 0.00 0.16
SEC Filer 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.19**
* 
0.00##
# 
0.39 0.17 0.00 0.38
Auditor 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.75**
* 
1.00##
# 
0.43 0.73 1.00 0.45
CBCA 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.27**
* 
0.00##
# 
0.44 0.33 0.00 0.47
***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed). ###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Size is the log of total assets (AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. 
Growth is the annual percentage change in sales (SALE). Intangibles is intangible assets (INTAN) scaled 
by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, 
and zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise. CBCA is 
equal to one if the firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel D: Pearson Correlation Table 
Variables Size Leverage Growth Intangibles SEC Filer Auditor CBCA 
        
Size 1.000 -0.144 0.021 0.120 0.109 0.366 0.195 
  0.000 0.437 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage  1.000 -0.013 0.009 0.031 -0.073 0.001 
   0.634 0.727 0.254 0.007 0.966 
Growth   1.000 0.016 0.025 0.013 -0.036 
    0.545 0.347 0.618 0.177 
Intangibles    1.000 0.042 -0.017 0.160 
     0.121 0.531 0.000 
SEC Filer     1.000 -0.009 0.038 
      0.739 0.152 
Auditor      1.000 0.040 
       0.134 
CBCA       1.000 
 p-values in italics. 
 
Size is the log of total assets (AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. 
Growth is the annual percentage change in sales (SALE). Intangibles is intangible assets (INTAN) scaled 
by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, 
and zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise. CBCA is 
equal to one if the firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel E: Incorporation Decision Conditional on Province 
Province 
Incorporation   
ABCA BCBCA OBCA QCA OTHER CBCA Total 
Alberta 308 8 9 0 5 52 382 
1 22.05 0.57 0.64 0.00 0.36 3.72 27.34 
2 80.63 2.09 2.36 0.00 1.31 13.61  
3 89.80 3.96 3.19 0.00 14.71 11.28   
British Columbia 14 173 8 0 6 66 267 
1 1.00 12.38 0.57 0.00 0.43 4.72 19.11 
2 5.24 64.79 3.00 0.00 2.25 24.72  
3 4.08 85.64 2.84 0.00 17.65 14.32   
Ontario 12 17 260 3 10 171 473 
1 0.86 1.22 18.61 0.21 0.72 12.24 33.86 
2 2.54 3.59 54.97 0.63 2.11 36.15  
3 3.50 8.42 92.20 4.00 29.41 37.09   
Quebec 2 2 4 71 0 147 226 
1 0.14 0.14 0.29 5.08 0 10.52 16.18 
2 0.88 0.88 1.77 31.42 0 65.04  
3 0.58 0.99 1.42 94.67 0.00 31.89   
Other Provinces 7 2 1 1 13 25 49 
1 0.5 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.93 1.79 3.51 
2 14.29 4.08 2.04 2.04 26.53 51.02  
3 2.04 0.99 0.35 1.33 38.24 5.42   
Total 343 202 282 75 34 461 1,397 
24.55 14.46 20.19 5.37 2.43 33.00 100.00 
1 is the percentage of the sample. 2 is the row percentage. 3 is the column percentage.   
 
Other Provinces includes Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, 
and Saskatchewan.  ABCA is the Alberta Business Corporations Act. BCBCA is the British Columbia 
Business Corporations Act. OBCA is the Ontario Business Corporations Act. QCA is the Quebec 
Companies Act. OTHER consists of the following provincial incorporation acts:  Manitoba Corporations 
Act, New Brunswick Business Corporations Act, Newfoundland Corporations Act, Nova Scotia 
Companies Act, Saskatchewan Companies Act, and the Yukon Business Corporations Act.  CBCA 
represents firms that incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, the federal 
incorporation statute in Canada. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel F: Accounting Standard Conditional on Province 
Province 
Accounting Standard   
Canadian GAAP US GAAP Total 
Alberta 378 4 382 
1 27.06 0.29 27.34 
2 98.95 1.05  
3 27.81 10.53   
British Columbia 257 10 267 
1 18.40 0.72 19.11 
2 96.25 3.75  
3 18.91 26.32   
Ontario 451 22 473 
1 32.28 1.57 33.86 
2 95.35 4.65  
3 33.19 57.89   
Quebec 224 2 226 
1 16.03 0.14 16.18 
2 99.12 0.88  
3 16.48 5.26   
Other Provinces 49 0 49 
1 3.51 0.00 3.51 
2 100.00 0.00  
3 3.61 0.00   
Total 1,359 38 1,397 
97.28 2.72 100.00 
1 is the percentage of the sample. 2 is the row percentage. 3 is the column percentage.   
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Canadian firms are permitted to report under either Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) or under US GAAP. Other Provinces includes Manitoba, New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. 
Table 2 presents our analysis of firms’ incorporation decisions.  The positive and 
significant coefficient on size for most models indicates that larger firms are more likely to 
incorporate at the federal level.  For brevity, we do not present industry effects, but note that 
various industries are associated both positively and negatively with incorporating at the federal 
level.  This finding is consistent with our discussions with Canadian regulators who suggested 
that provincial incorporation is common in certain industries (i.e., mining and oil and gas).  In 
our province of primary interest, Quebec, only industry effects are associated with the decision to 
incorporate under the CBCA.  This analysis suggests that controlling for size and industry are 
important in our analysis of earnings attributes, which we address by matching on size and 
industry.    
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Table 2: Logistic Regression of Firm Incorporation Decision 
The sample for the analysis of firms’ incorporation decisions consists of the last year each firm 
in our sample reports to System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) 
between January 1, 1997 and November 30, 2009.  SEDAR data is not available prior to January 
1, 1997 and Compustat data was not available after November 30, 2009 at the time we began our 
study.  This results in a final sample of 1,397 firms. 
 
Panel A: Pooled Analysis 
Variables All Provinces All Provinces  All Provinces  All Provinces 
Intercept -1.767*** -1.680*  -0.533**  -0.653 
 (0.174) (0.893)  (0.218)  (0.954) 
Size 0.199*** 0.219***  0.195***  0.210*** 
 (0.031) (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.035) 
Leverage 0.120 0.060  0.076  0.060 
 (0.158) (0.171)  (0.164)  (0.173) 
Growth -0.054 -0.025  -0.022  -0.012 
 (0.036) (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Intangibles 1.760*** 0.797**  0.730*  0.420 
 (0.352) (0.397)  (0.383)  (0.420) 
SEC Filer 0.043 0.046  0.170  0.167 
 (0.157) (0.165)  (0.170)  (0.175) 
Auditor -0.119 -0.118  0.144  0.117 
 (0.145) (0.149)  (0.156)  (0.158) 
Alberta    -2.510***  -2.230*** 
    (0.216)  (0.234) 
British Columbia    -1.591***  -1.449*** 
    (0.214)  (0.221) 
Ontario    -1.226***  -1.167*** 
    (0.177)  (0.183) 
Other Provinces    -0.714**  -0.640* 
    (0.329)  (0.336) 
       
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes  No  Yes 
Observations 1,397 1,397  1,397  1,397 
Log Likelihood 843.660*** 797.933***  761.235***  744.777*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.099  0.141  0.159 
***, **, * indicates two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
CBCA is equal to one if a firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, and zero otherwise. Size is the log of total assets 
(AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentages changes in sales (SALE). Intangibles is 
intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, and 
zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise. Alberta is equal to one if the firm is headquartered in 
Alberta, and zero otherwise. British Columbia is equal to one if the firm is headquartered in British Columbia, and zero otherwise. Ontario is 
equal to one if the firm is headquartered in Ontario, and zero otherwise. Quebec is equal to one if the firm is headquartered in Quebec, and zero 
otherwise. Other Provinces includes Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression of Firm Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel B: By Province Analysis with Industry Fixed Effects 
Variables Alberta 
British 
Columbia Ontario Quebec 
Other 
Provinces 
      
Intercept -3.585*** -2.100*** -2.683*** 1.473* 1.603 
 (0.907) (0.665) (0.731) (0.862) (1.956) 
      
Size 0.265*** 0.251*** 0.174*** 0.075 0.040 
 (0.095) (0.080) (0.057) (0.078) (0.216) 
      
Leverage 0.641 -0.001 -0.023 0.354 -1.487 
 (0.861) (0.039) (0.128) (0.387) (1.210) 
      
Growth -0.409* -0.013 -0.006 0.209 -0.666 
 (0.247) (0.030) (0.025) (0.193) (0.473) 
      
Intangibles 1.142 1.485 -0.076 0.185 3.725 
 (1.370) (1.073) (0.654) (0.794) (2.696) 
      
SEC Filer 0.805 0.067 0.308 0.032 -0.400 
 (0.505) (0.344) (0.269) (0.553) (1.269) 
      
Auditor -0.329 0.312 0.377 0.056 -0.106 
 (0.435) (0.423) (0.257) (0.327) (0.943) 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 382 267 473 226 49 
Log Likelihood 134.471*** 126.005*** 292.950** 131.198** 26.592 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.115 0.152 0.053 0.104 0.218 
***, **, * indicates two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
CBCA is equal to one if a firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, 
and zero otherwise. Size is the log of total assets (AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) 
divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentage change in sales (SALE). Intangibles is 
intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with 
the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, and zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm 
uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 2: Logistic Regression of Firm Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel C: By Province Analysis without Industry Fixed Effects 
Variables Alberta 
British 
Columbia Ontario Quebec 
Other 
Provinces 
      
Intercept -3.049*** -2.398*** -1.637*** -0.304 -0.329 
 (0.565) (0.392) (0.305) (0.391) (1.064) 
      
Size 0.245*** 0.237*** 0.169*** 0.115 0.128 
 (0.091) (0.074) (0.054) (0.072) (0.176) 
      
Leverage 0.395 0.037 -0.142 0.618 -0.732 
 (0.806) (0.307) (0.299) (0.431) (0.790) 
      
Growth -0.377 -0.031 0.019 0.139 -0.335 
 (0.232) (0.065) (0.049) (0.155) (0.380) 
      
Intangibles 1.516 2.455** -0.189 0.857 1.898 
 (1.216) (0.975) (0.598) (0.757) (1.956) 
      
SEC Filer 1.013** -0.215 0.281 -0.167 -0.542 
 (0.459) (0.321) (0.261) (0.510) (1.046) 
      
Auditor -0.296 0.297 0.310 0.119 -0.108 
 (0.428) (0.397) (0.251) (0.305) (0.733) 
Industry Fixed 
Effects No No No No No 
Observations 382 267 473 226 49 
Log Likelihood 137.623*** 135.410*** 299.418** 142.005 30.788 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.0945 0.0931 0.0325 0.0291 0.0932 
***, **, * indicates two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
CBCA is equal to one if a firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, 
and zero otherwise. Size is the log of total assets (AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) 
divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentage change in sales (SALE). Intangibles is 
intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with 
the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, and zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm 
uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Matched-Pairs 
The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched sample and consists of 167 unique Quebec firms and their 
matched pairs. Quebec firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on incorporation level, industry and market value 
and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 738 firm-years. 
 
Panel A: All Matched-Pairs 
  Quebec (N = 738 firm-years)   Non-Quebec (N = 738 firm-years) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
          
Firm Characteristics:         
          
Size 5.389 5.516 1.871  5.297  5.463  2.242 
MV 5.091 5.224 1.808  5.242  5.230  1.888 
Sales 1,023 283 2,346  1,564 *** 239  3,857 
Growth 0.188 0.071 0.686  0.224  0.073  0.763 
Leverage 0.246 0.224 0.241  0.262  0.221  0.486 
          
Variables to Construct Earnings Attributes:       
          
TCAt -0.001 0.002 0.082  0.005  0.004  0.107 
CFOt-1 0.013 0.064 0.245  -0.060 *** 0.050 ### 0.380 
CFOt 0.023 0.075 0.230  -0.052 *** 0.057 ### 0.364 
CFOt+1 0.032 0.084 0.260  -0.067 *** 0.057 ### 0.458 
Xt-1 0.237 0.260 1.268  0.172  0.184  2.108 
Xt 0.245 0.260 1.255  0.228  0.184  2.054 
NIBEt -0.030 0.037 0.276  -0.124 *** 0.036  0.504 
CFOSt 0.018 0.078 0.299  -0.086 *** 0.059 ### 0.532 
RETt 0.139 0.015 0.659  0.179  0.060  0.753 
EARNt 0.002 0.052 0.238  -0.031 ** 0.040 ### 0.273 
ΔEARNt 0.038 0.006 0.366  0.030  0.006  0.330 
NEGt 0.483 0.000 0.500  0.445  0.000  0.497 
                    
 ***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Size is the log of total assets (AT). MV is the log of market value (CSHO*PRCC_F). Sales is the firm’s sales 
(SALE). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentage change 
in sales (SALE). TCAt is total current accruals scaled by average total assets. CFOt is the cash flow from operations 
in year t calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) less total accruals scaled by average total assets. Xt is 
the split-adjusted earnings per share calculated as income before extraordinary items in year t divided by the 
weighted average number of outstanding shares during year t. NIBEt is net income before extraordinary items scaled 
by beginning total assets. CFOSt is CFOt scaled by beginning total assets. RETt is the 12-month return ending three 
months after the end of fiscal year t. EARNt is income before extraordinary items scaled by market value at the end 
of year t-1. ΔEARNt is the change in income before extraordinary items in year t scaled by market value at the end 
of year t-1. NEGt is equal to one if RETt < 0, and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
extreme percentiles. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Matched-Pairs (continued) 
The sample consists of all firms-years for the Quebec QCA matched sample and consists of 65 unique Quebec QCA 
firms and their matched pairs. Quebec QCA firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on incorporation level, industry 
and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 338 firm-years. 
 
Panel B: Quebec QCA firms to Non-Quebec Provincial firms 
  Quebec (N =  338 firm-years)   Non-Quebec (N = 338 firm-years) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
          
Firm Characteristics:         
          
Size 5.061 5.247 2.092  4.656 ** 4.657 ## 2.373 
MV 4.789 4.989 1.873  4.777  4.846  1.942 
Sales 1040 213 2334  838  113 ## 2012 
Growth 0.222 0.082 0.762  0.264  0.079  0.808 
Leverage 0.272 0.240 0.290  0.284  0.214 ## 0.679 
          
Variables to Construct Earnings Attributes:       
          
TCAt 0.000 0.003 0.083  0.007  0.006  0.006 
CFOt-1 -0.024 0.052 0.303  -0.129 *** 0.031 ## 0.031 
CFOt -0.018 0.059 0.288  -0.121 *** 0.044 ## 0.044 
CFOt+1 0.006 0.065 0.284  -0.134 *** 0.046 ## 0.046 
Xt-1 0.253 0.200 1.195  0.139  0.054  0.054 
Xt 0.249 0.167 1.233  0.166  0.068 # 0.068 
NIBEt -0.071 0.028 0.360  -0.206 *** 0.022  0.022 
CFOSt -0.033 0.061 0.401  -0.174 *** 0.046 # 0.046 
RETt 0.117 -0.016 0.704  0.200  0.041  0.041 
EARNt -0.019 0.050 0.275  -0.050  0.022 ### 0.022 
ΔEARNt 0.040 0.005 0.381  0.047  0.000  0.000 
NEGt 0.509 1.000 0.501  0.462  0.000  0.000 
                    
 ***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). ###, ##, # 
indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
The sample consists of all firms-years for Quebec QCA firms are matched to non-Quebec firms incorporated at the provincial 
level on industry and market value. Size is the log of total assets (AT). MV is the log of market value (CSHO*PRCC_F). Sales is 
the firm’s sales (SALE). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentages 
changes in sales (SALE). TCAt is total current accruals scaled by average total assets. CFOt is the cash flow from operations in 
year t calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) less total accruals scaled by average total assets. Xt is the split-
adjusted earnings per share calculated as income before extraordinary items in year t divided by the weighted average number of 
outstanding shares during year t. NIBEt is net income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets. CFOSt is CFOt 
scaled by beginning total assets. RETt is the 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. EARNt is income 
before extraordinary items scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. ΔEARNt is the change in income before extraordinary 
items in year t scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. NEGt is equal to one if RETt < 0, and zero otherwise. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the extreme percentiles. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Matched-Pairs (continued) 
The sample consists of all firms-years for the Quebec CBCA matched sample and consists of 102 unique Quebec 
CBCA firms and their matched pairs. Quebec CBCA firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on incorporation level, 
industry and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 405 firm-years. 
 
Panel C: Quebec CBCA firms to Non-Quebec CBCA firms 
  Quebec (N =  405 firm-years)   Non-Quebec (N = 405 firm-years) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
          
Firm Characteristics:         
          
Size 5.663 5.650 1.618  5.831  5.919 # 1.975 
MV 5.342 5.388 1.714  5.630 ** 5.420 ## 1.752 
Sales 1,010 349 2,359  2,169 *** 435  4,811 
Growth 0.161 0.065 0.620  0.193  0.070  0.727 
Leverage 0.225 0.207 0.187  0.244  0.230  0.223 
          
Variables to Construct Earnings Attributes:       
          
TCAt -0.002 0.001 0.080  0.004  0.003  0.089 
CFOt-1 0.044 0.077 0.178  -0.002 *** 0.061 ## 0.278 
CFOt 0.057 0.084 0.160  0.006 *** 0.068 ### 0.243 
CFOt+1 0.054 0.091 0.237  -0.011 *** 0.068 ### 0.325 
Xt 0.241 0.300 1.275  0.280  0.341  2.286 
Xt-1 0.224 0.290 1.327  0.199  0.340  2.352 
NIBEt 0.004 0.044 0.173  -0.056 *** 0.039 # 0.337 
CFOSt 0.060 0.087 0.162  -0.013 *** 0.070 ### 0.356 
RETt 0.157 0.035 0.618  0.161  0.067  0.676 
EARNt 0.019 0.054 0.201  -0.016 ** 0.053  0.261 
ΔEARNt 0.037 0.006 0.353  0.017  0.008  0.259 
NEGt 0.462 0.000 0.499  0.432  0.000  0.496 
                    
***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). ###, ##, # 
indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
The sample consists of all firms-years for Quebec CBCA firms are matched to non-Quebec CBCA firms on industry and market 
value. Size is the log of total assets (AT). MV is the log of market value (CSHO*PRCC_F). Sales is the firm’s sales (SALE). 
Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentages changes in sales (SALE). 
TCAt is total current accruals scaled by average total assets. CFOt is the cash flow from operations in year t calculated as income 
before extraordinary items (IB) less total accruals scaled by average total assets. Xt is the split-adjusted earnings per share 
calculated as income before extraordinary items in year t divided by the weighted average number of outstanding shares during 
year t. NIBEt is net income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets. CFOSt is CFOt scaled by beginning total 
assets. RETt is the 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. EARNt is income before extraordinary 
items scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. ΔEARNt is the change in income before extraordinary items in year t scaled 
by market value at the end of year t-1. NEGt is equal to one if RETt < 0, and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the extreme percentiles. 
  
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Matched-Pairs (continued) 
Panel D: Pearson Correlation Table for Variables Used to Construct Earnings Attributes 
 
Variable TCAt CFOt-1 CFOt CFOt+1 Xt Xt-1 NIBEt CFOSt RETt EARNt ΔEARNt NEGt 
TCAt 1.000 0.050 -0.180 0.068 0.115 0.033 0.090 -0.162 0.087 0.153 0.049 -0.082 
  0.051 <.0001 0.008 <.0001 0.196 0.001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 0.055 0.001 
CFOt-1  1.000 0.678 0.573 0.164 0.290 0.616 0.579 0.019 0.369 -0.250 -0.105 
   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.464 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CFOt   1.000 0.721 0.294 0.206 0.871 0.903 0.049 0.602 0.137 -0.127 
    <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.055 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CFOt+1    1.000 0.176 0.154 0.723 0.704 -0.003 0.399 0.052 -0.103 
     <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.896 <.0001 0.041 <.0001 
Xt     1.000 0.596 0.289 0.251 0.124 0.516 0.172 -0.184 
      <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Xt-1      1.000 0.188 0.167 -0.014 0.306 -0.308 -0.070 
       <.0001 <.0001 0.585 <.0001 <.0001 0.007 
NIBEt       1.000 0.948 0.043 0.639 0.177 -0.116 
        <.0001 0.096 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CFOSt        1.000 0.006 0.590 0.164 -0.078 
         0.820 <.0001 <.0001 0.003 
RETt         1.000 0.115 0.178 -0.601 
          <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
EARNt          1.000 0.236 -0.183 
           <.0001 <.0001 
ΔEARNt           1.000 -0.107 
            <.0001 
NEGt            1.000 
p-values in italics. 
 
We pool Quebec and Non-Quebec firms for this analysis.
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6.  Analysis of Earnings Attributes 
Following prior research, including Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003), Leuz (2003), 
Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006), Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008), we construct our earnings 
attributes based on cross-sectional data.33  To construct statistical tests of difference, we employ 
bootstrap-based tests, which use the sample data to generate a distribution for the test statistic.  
We follow the procedure outlined by Noreen (1989) referred to as “approximate 
randomization.”34  Dichev and Tang (2009) and Minnis (2010) use this procedure to test 
differences in R2.  A key advantage of this approach is that it does not require assumptions about 
the distribution of each earnings attribute.  Our null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between Quebec and non-Quebec firms and approximate randomization examines how 
frequently the observed differences in earnings attributes would occur randomly.  Specifically, 
we randomly assign firms as Quebec and non-Quebec firms.  Then we calculate each earnings 
attribute for ‘pseudo’ Quebec and non-Quebec firms and record the difference in earnings 
attributes between the two groups.  We then note if the differences in earnings attributes from the 
randomly generated sample is greater than the actual observed differences.  We repeat these 
steps 10,000 and the p-value is the number of times the randomly generated difference in an 
earnings attribute is greater than the actual difference.    
Table 4 reports the results from comparing the earnings attributes for 738 matched pairs 
of firm years.  Recall that for each matched pair, one firm is located in Quebec, while the other 
firm is located in a province other than Quebec.  Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) hypothesize that 
financial reporting incentives shape the standards and provide evidence that accounting standards 
                                                 
33 An alternative approach would be to estimate firm-specific earnings attributes using a time series of firm-specific 
data. We do not use this approach because it would severely limit our sample size due the length of the time series 
required to estimate the earnings attributes. 
34 We also perform bootstrap tests following Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) and find similar results. 
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differ between common law countries and civil law countries.  To control for differences 
in accounting standards, we omit those Canadian firms that report under US GAAP, such that 
both Quebec and non-Quebec firms in our matched pairs report under Canadian GAAP.  As a 
consequence, any differences in earnings attributes for our matched pairs, which we report 
below, are not due to accounting standards per se, but rather due to the underlying financial 
reporting incentives.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the tests for differences between Quebec and non-Quebec 
firms with regards to accounting-based earnings attributes.  First, we find that Accrual Quality is 
statistically significantly higher for Quebec firms at the 1 percent significance level (as 
evidenced by the lower standard deviation of residuals from the accrual regression specified in 
equation (1)).  Second, we find that Persistence is statistically significantly higher for non-
Quebec firms at the 4 percent significance level.  Third, we find that Predictability is statistically 
significantly for non-Quebec at the 2 percent level (as evidenced by the lower standard 
deviation).  In summary, these three intrinsic accounting-based earnings attributes differ for 
similar Canadian firms located inside and outside Quebec. 
Similarly, Panel B of Table 4 reports our tests for differences in market-based earnings 
attributes.  We only find statistically significant differences with regards to Timeliness, which is 
statistically significantly higher for Quebec firms.  Since Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) find 
that Timeliness is higher for common law countries, one would have expected the reverse result 
based on their hypothesized differences in accounting standards.  As a consequence, our finding 
suggests the importance of controlling for differences in accounting standards when investigating 
the pure direct effect of financial reporting incentives on Timeliness. 
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Table 4: Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Quebec and Matched Non-Quebec 
Firms 
 
This table compares earnings attributes from Quebec firms to their non-Quebec matched pairs.  
The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched sample and consists of 167 unique 
Quebec firms and their matched pairs. Quebec firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on 
incorporation level, industry and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained 
resulting in 738 firm-years.  The statistical tests of differences are based on bootstrap-based tests 
(see Section 6 for details). 
 
Panel A: Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Quebec Non-Quebec Difference p-value 
Accrual Quality 0.076 0.095 -0.019 <0.01 *** 
Persistence 0.436 0.648 -0.212 0.04 ** 
Predictability 1.127 1.534 -0.407 0.02 ** 
Smoothness 0.924 0.948 -0.024 0.27 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Accrual Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on 
future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations. Persistence is the 
estimated slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earnings. Predictability is the standard 
deviation of the residual from the Persistence regression. Smoothness is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations (scaled by assets).  
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Table 4: Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Quebec and Matched Non-Quebec 
Firms (continued) 
 
Panel B: Market-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Quebec Non-Quebec Difference p-value 
Relevance 0.031 0.061 -0.029 0.21 
Timeliness 0.115 0.070 0.044 0.09 * 
Conservatism 0.431 0.424 0.007 0.46 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Relevance is the adjusted R2 from a regression of annual returns on the level and change in 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items). Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from a regression of 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator variable equaling one if the 
company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the 
interaction of the annual return and the indicator variable. Conservatism is the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction variable from the Timeliness regression. 
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Given the self-selection issue raised in Table 2, with regards to managers’ decision about 
where to incorporate, we also repeated our analysis after controlling for whether firms 
incorporated under either Federal statute (CBCA) or provincial statutes of incorporation.  These 
results are reported in Table 5.  Panel A of Table 5 makes pairwise comparisons of accounting-
based earnings attributes for firms that incorporated under Federal and provincial statutes, 
respectively.  First, we find that the differences reported in Panel A of Table 4 in Accrual Quality 
and Persistence are driven by matched pairs of firms that reported under provincial statute.  Since 
our selection model for managers’ incorporation decision outside Quebec – as reported in Table 
2 – is driven by the two variables that we use for matching in this analysis, Size and Industry, we 
have no reason to believe that differences across non-Quebec provincial statutes constrain firm 
managers’ subsequent financial reporting incentives.  However, our model for managers’ 
incorporation decision also reveals that Quebec firms’ incorporation decision differs from that of 
non-Quebec firms.  As a consequence, differences might persist when comparing provincial 
statutes simply due to unmodeled differences in the incorporation decision.  Again, these 
differences could be explained by the fact that QCA lends lower degree of protection of minority 
shareholder rights than other non-Quebec provincial statutes. 
Panel A of Table 5 also reports statistically significant differences in Predictability and 
Smoothness.  These latter differences, however, are driven by matched pairs of firms that 
reported under the same Federal statute.  As a consequence, these differences are not likely 
subject to the concern that incorporation decision differences fully explain the difference in 
subsequent financial reporting incentives.  Panel B of Table 5 reports that our differences in 
Timeliness reported in Panel B of Table 4 appear to be driven by differences among matched 
pairs of firms which incorporated under the provincial statute. 
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Table 5: Pairwise Comparisons  
This table compares earnings attributes from Quebec firms to their non-Quebec matched pairs 
partitioned on the level of incorporation.  The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched 
sample and consists of 167 unique Quebec firms (65 QCA and 102 CBCA firms) and their 
matched pairs. Quebec firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on incorporation level, industry 
and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 738 firm-years (338 
firm-years for QCA firms and 405 firm-years for CBCA firms).  The statistical tests of 
differences are based on bootstrap-based tests (see Section 6 for details). 
 
Panel A: Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes 
Incorporation   Location           
(1) (2) (1) - (2)   
Quebec Non-Quebec Difference p-value 
Accrual Quality 
CBCA 0.072 0.078 -0.006 0.22 
Provincial 0.079 0.112 -0.033 <0.01 *** 
Persistence 
CBCA 0.484 0.638 -0.155 0.16 
Provincial 0.365 0.667 -0.301 0.07 * 
Predictability 
CBCA 1.102 1.724 -0.622 0.02 ** 
Provincial 1.153 1.271 -0.119 0.33 
Smoothness 
CBCA 1.070 0.945 0.124 0.09 * 
Provincial 0.896 0.949 -0.053 0.12 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Accrual Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on 
future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations. Persistence is the 
estimated slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earnings. Predictability is the standard 
deviation of the residual from the Persistence regression. Smoothness is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations (scaled by assets).  
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Table 5: Pairwise Comparisons (continued) 
 
Panel B: Market-Based Earnings Attributes 
Location   Incorporation           
(1) (2) (1) - (2)   
Quebec Non-Quebec Difference p-value 
Relevance 
CBCA 0.052 0.111 -0.059 0.14 
Provincial 0.022 0.033 -0.011 0.39 
              
Timeliness 
CBCA 0.121 0.109 0.012 0.42 
Provincial 0.110 0.037 0.074 0.06 * 
              
Conservatism 
CBCA 0.316 0.469 -0.153 0.11 
Provincial 0.551 0.382 0.169 0.14 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Relevance is the adjusted R2 from a regression of annual returns on the level and change in 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items). Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from a regression of 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator variable equaling one if the 
company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the 
interaction of the annual return and the indicator variable. Conservatism is the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction variable from the Timeliness regression. 
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In summary, we find that differences in earnings attributes persist after controlling for the 
accounting standards.  Our results also point to the importance of controlling for the 
incorporation decision.  After controlling for both accounting standards and for the incorporation 
decision, we still find differences in earnings attributes.   
      
7.  Conclusion and Future Work 
 This paper investigates whether intra-country variation in legal origin manifests itself in 
variation in earnings attributes.  Specifically, this paper documents variation among Canadian 
firms’ earnings attributes along two dimensions: the location of firms' headquarters (inside or 
outside Quebec) and the incorporation either at the federal level (CBCA) or at the provincial 
level.  Overall, our results suggest that managers’ financial reporting incentives – perhaps driven 
by financial statement users’ differential demand for earnings quality – may differ between civil 
law and common law regions of a country.  On the one hand, Kedia and Rajgopal (2010) offer 
evidence consistent with geographical variation in financial reporting incentives within the US as 
they document that SEC enforcement varies with distance of firms’ headquarters from the 
nearest SEC regional office.  On the other hand, Bozec, Rousseau, and Laurin (2008) and 
Merrell (2010) document intra-country variation in ownership structure for Canada and US.  
Their findings could suggest that legal origin, ownership structure, and firms' incorporation 
decisions are codetermined and may jointly affect financial reporting incentives. 
Kedia and Rajgopal (2009) document variation in the usage of stock options within the 
US.  Future research might investigate whether executive compensation practices vary within 
Canada between Quebec and non-Quebec companies.  While such variation in compensation 
practices could be attributable to legal origin, this variation might also arise due to partially 
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segmented labor markets due to language barriers.  A French speaking executive in Quebec 
might be more likely to be hired by a company based in France than a company based in the US 
or the rest of Canada.  Similarly, an English speaking Canadian executive working outside 
Quebec might be less likely to be hired by a Quebec-based firm where French is the working 
language than a US-based firm where English is the working language.  Since Europe, in 
general, has lower pay than North America, we would expect lower labor mobility from Canada 
to France than to the US.  Such differences in getting hired might arise from the demand or 
supply side of the labor market.  The demand for executives are likely driven by the language 
and overall culture a firm and its board members.  The supply of executives willing to move are 
likely guided by the immediate family’s functional language and proximity to other family 
members.  Of course, the research setting for such an experiment is not exclusive to Canada, 
since Belgium is a civil law country which has a similar partition with the north and south being 
culturally and language-wise closer to The Netherlands and France, respectively.  Further, this 
experiment is more difficult because executive compensation has not traditionally been disclosed 
in a transparent and consistent manner across Europe.  In summary, this paper suggests future 
research that may further develop and address intra-country variation in corporate governance 
outcomes. 
  
 
79 
 
CHAPTER 1 REFERENCES 
 
Admati, A.R. and P. Pfleiderer. 2000.  Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation 
and Externalities.  The Review of Financial Studies 13: 479-519. 
 
Barton, J. and G. Waymire. 2004.  Investor Protection Under Unregulated Financial Reporting.  
Journal of Accounting and Economics 38: 65-116. 
 
Benston, G.J. 1973.  Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The American Economic Review 63: 132-155. 
 
Berger, P.G. and R.N. Hann. 2003.  The Impact of SFAS No. 131 on Information and 
Monitoring.  Journal of Accounting Research 41: 163-223. 
 
Beyer, A., D.A. Cohen, T.Z. Lys, and B.R. Walther. 2010.  The Financial Reporting 
Environment: Review of the Recent Literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50: 296-
343. 
 
Blankespoor, E., G.S. Miller, and H.D. White. 2010.  The Impact of Managerial Dissemination 
of Firm Disclosure.  Working Paper, University of Michigan. 
 
Botosan, C.A. 1997.  Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital. The Accounting Review 
72: 323-349. 
 
Botosan, C.A. and M. Stanford. 2005.  Managers’ Motives to Withhold Segment Disclosures and 
the Effects of SFAS No. 131 on Analysts’ Information Environment.  The Accounting Review 
80: 751-771. 
 
Brown, S., K. Lo, and T. Lys. 1999.  Use of R2 in Accounting Research: Measuring Changes in 
Value Relevance Over the Last Four Decades.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 28: 83-
115. 
 
Bushee, B.J. and C. Leuz. 2005.  Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: 
Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 39: 233-264. 
 
Chow, C. 1983.  The Impacts of Accounting Regulation on Bondholder and Shareholder Wealth: 
The Case of the Securities Acts.  The Accounting Review 58: 485-520. 
 
Coffee, J. 1984.  Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System. 
Virginia Law Review 70: 717-753. 
 
Cramer, J.S. 1987.  Mean and Variance of R2 in Small and Moderate Samples.  Journal of 
Econometrics 35: 253-266. 
 
Daines, R. and C.M. Jones. 2005.  Mandatory Disclosure, Asymmetric Information and 
Liquidity: The Impact of the 1934 Act.  Working Paper, Stanford University.  
 
80 
 
 
Dye, R.A. 1985.  Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information.  Journal of Accounting Research 
23: 123-145. 
 
Dye, R.A. 1990.  Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and Real 
Externalities.  The Accounting Review 65: 1-24. 
 
Ely, K. and G. Waymire. 1999.  Intangible Assets and Stock Prices in the Per-SEC Era.  Journal 
of Accounting Research 37: 17-44. 
 
Ferrell, A. 2007.  Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter 
Market.  Journal of Legal Studies 36: 213-251. 
 
Fields, T.D., T.Z. Lys, and L. Vincent. 2001.  Empirical Research on Accounting Choice. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 31: 255-307. 
 
Fishman, M.J. and K.M. Hagerty. 1989.  Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for 
Price Efficiency.  Journal of Finance 44: 633-646. 
 
Francis, J. and K. Schipper. 1999.  Have Financial Statements Lost Their Relevance?  Journal of 
Accounting Research 37: 319-352. 
 
Frost, C.A., E.A. Gordon, and A.F. Hayes. 2006. Stock Exchange Disclosure and Market 
Development: An Analysis of 50 International Exchanges. Journal of Accounting Research 44: 
437–483.  
 
Greene, W.H. 2003. Econometric Analysis, Fifth Edition, Prentice Hall. 
 
Greenstone, M., P. Oyer, and A. Vissing-Jorgensen. 2006.  Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, 
and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments.  The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121: 399-460. 
 
Grossman, S.J. 1981.  The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about 
Product Quality.  Journal of Law and Economics 24: 461-483. 
 
Hand, J.R. 2003.  Profits, Losses and the Nonlinear Pricing of Internet Stocks.  J. Hand & B. Lev 
(Eds). Intangible Assets: Values, Measures, and Risks New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hayn, C. 1995.  The Information Content of Losses.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 20: 
125-153. 
 
Healy, P.M. and K.G. Palepu. 2001.  Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the 
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature.  Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 31: 405-440. 
 
Heckman, J., 1979. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica 47: 153–161. 
 
 
81 
 
Jarrell, G.A. 1981.  The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security 
Issues.  Journal of Law and Economics 24: 613-675. 
 
Jorgensen, B.N. and M. Kirschenheiter. 2010.  Interactive Discretionary Disclosures.  
Forthcoming in Contemporary Accounting Research. 
 
Keating, E.K., T.Z. Lys, and R.P. Magee. 2003.  Internet Downturn: Finding Valuation Factors 
in Spring 2000. Journal of Accounting and Economics 34: 189-236. 
 
King, R., G. Pownall, and G. Waymire. 1990.  Expectations Adjustments via Timely 
Management Forecasts: Review, Synthesis, and Suggestions for Future Research.  Journal of 
Accounting Literature 9: 113-144. 
 
Kyle, A.S. 1985.  Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading.  Econometrica 53: 1315-1335. 
 
Lang, M. and R. Lundholm. 1993.  Cross-sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of 
Corporate Disclosures.  Journal of Accounting Research 31: 246-271. 
 
Leuz, C. 2010.  Different Approaches to Corporate Reporting Regulation: How Jurisdictions 
Differ and Why.  Accounting and Business Research 40: 229-256. 
 
Leuz, C. and P. Wysocki. 2009.  Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure 
Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research.  Working Paper, University of 
Chicago. 
 
Luft, C. and L.M. Levine. 2004.  Over the Counter Bulletin Board Exchange: The Impact of 
Liquidity and Size to Return, Volatility, and Bid/Ask Spread.  The Journal of Alternative 
Investments 4: 95-106. 
 
Luft, C., L.M. Levine, and S. Larson. 2001.  Over the Counter Bulletin Board Exchange: Market 
Structure, Risk, and Return.  The Journal of Alternative Investments 4: 33-42. 
 
Mahoney, P.G. and J. Mei. 2006.  Mandatory vs. Contractual Disclosure in Securities Markets: 
Evidence from the 1930s.  Working Paper, University of Virginia.  
 
Manne, H.G. 1966.  In Defense of Insider Trading. Harvard Business Review 44: 113-122. 
 
Milgrom, P.R. 1981.  Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications.  
Bell Journal of Economics 12: 380-391. 
 
Rajgopal, S., M. Vankatachalam, and S. Kotha. 2003.  The Value Relevance of Network 
Advantages: The Case of E-Commerce Firms. Journal of Accounting Research 41: 135-162. 
 
Ross, S. 1979.  Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance 
Theory and Signaling Theory, Issues in Financial Regulation F. Edwards (ed.), McGraw-Hill, 
New York. 
 
82 
 
 
Simon, C.J. 1989.  The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the 
Performance of New Issues.  The American Economic Review 79: 295-318. 
 
Sivakumar, K.N. and G. Waymire. 1993.  The Information Content of Earnings in a 
Discretionary Reporting Environment: Evidence from NYSE Industrials, 1905-10.  Journal of 
Accounting Research 31: 62-91. 
 
Sivkumar, K.N. and G. Waymire. 2003.  Enforceable Accounting rules and Income 
Measurement by Early 20th Century Railroads.  Journal of Accounting Research 41: 397-432. 
 
Skinner, D. 1994.  Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News. Journal of Accounting Research 
32: 38-60. 
 
Stigler, G.J. 1964.  Public Regulation of the Securities Markets.  Journal of Business 37: 117-
142. 
 
Trueman, B., M.H. Wong, and X.J. Zhang. 2000.  The Eyeballs Have It: Searching for the Value 
in Internet Stocks.  Journal of Accounting Research 28: 137-162. 
 
Verrecchia, R.E. 1983.  Discretionary Disclosure.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 5: 179-
194. 
 
Verrecchia, R.E. 2001.  Essays on Disclosure.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 32: 91-
180. 
 
Watts, R.L. and J.L. Zimmerman. 1986.  Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice-Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey. 
 
Willenborg, M. 1999.  Empirical Analysis of the Economic Demand for Auditing in the Initial 
Public Offerings Market.  Journal of Accounting Research 37: 225-238. 
  
 
83 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 REFERENCES 
 
Aiken, M. 2004. Comment: A Minority Shareholder’s Rights in Dissension – How Does 
Delaware Do It and What Can Louisiana Learn?  Loyola Law Review 50 Loy L. Rev. 231. 
 
Ball, R., Kothari, S.P., and Robin, A. 2000. The Effect of Institutional Factors on Properties of 
Accounting Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 (February): 1-51. 
 
Bandyopadhyay, S.P., Hanna, J.D., and Richardson, G. 1994. Capital Market Effects of U.S.-
Canada GAAP Differences. Journal of Accounting Research 32 (2): 262-277.  
 
Barth, M., Landsman, W., and Lang, M. 2008. International Accounting Standards and 
Accounting Quality. Journal of Accounting Research 46: 467-498. 
 
Barton, J., Hansen, T.B., and Pownall, G. 2010. Which Performance Measures Do Investors 
Around the World Value the Most – and Why? The Accounting Review 85: 753-789. 
 
Basu, S. 1997. The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings,” Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 24: 3-37.  
 
Bozec, Y., Rousseau, S., and Laurin, C., 2008. Law of Incorporation and Firm Ownership 
Structure: The Law and Finance Theory Revisited. International Review of Law and Economics 
28: 140-149.  
 
Bushman, R.M., and Smith, A.J. 2001. Financial Accounting Information and Corporate 
Governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 32 (1-3): 237-333. 
 
Bushman, R., Chen, Q., Engel, E., and Smith, A. J. 2004. Financial Accounting Information, 
Organizational Complexity and Corporate Governance Systems. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 37 (June): 139-201. 
 
Bushman, R.M. and Piotroski, J.D. 2006. Financial Reporting Incentives for Conservative 
Accounting: The Influence of Legal and Political Institutions. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 42: 107-148.  
 
Carnaghan, C., and Gunz, S. P. 2007. Recent Changes in the Regulation of Financial Markets 
and Reporting in Canada. Canadian Accounting Perspectives 6: 55-94. 
 
Cloutier, M. 2009. Bill 63: Business Corporations Act. Available at: 
http://www.industrymailout.com/Industry/LandingPage.aspx?id=451233&p=1 
 
Core, J. 1997. On the Corporate Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance. Journal of Risk 
and Insurance 64: 63-87. 
 
Daniels, R.J. 1991. Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law 
Market. Revue de droit de McGill 36: 130. 
84 
 
Dennis, J.L.S. 2003. Louisiana Bicentenary: A Fusion of Legal Culture 1803-2003, A 
Symposium Article. Louisiana Law Review. 
 
Dichev, I. and V. Tang. 2009. Earnings Volatility and Earning Predictability. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 47: 160-181. 
 
Dietrich, J.R., Muller, K.A., and Riedl, E. J. 2007. Asymmetric Timeliness Tests of Accounting 
Conservatism. Review of Accounting Studies 12 (March): 95-124. 
 
Dyck, A., and Zingales, L. 2004. Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison. 
Journal of Finance. 59: 537-600. 
 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P.M., and Schipper, K. 2004. The Costs of Equity and Earnings 
Attributes. The Accounting Review 79 (October): 967-1010. 
 
Givoly, D., and Hayn, C. 2000. The Changing Time-Series Properties of Earnings, Cash Flows 
and Accruals: Has Financial Reporting Become More Conservative? Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 29 (June): 287-320. 
 
Givoly, D., Hayn, C., and Natarajan, A. 2007. Measuring Reporting Conservatism. The 
Accounting Research 82 (January): 65-106. 
 
Goel, A.M., and Thakor, A. 2003. Why do Firms Smooth Earnings? Journal of Business 76 
(January): 151-192. 
 
Henry, P.B., and Miller, C. 2009. Institutions vs. Policies:  A Tale of Two Islands. American 
Economic Review 99 (2): 235-272. 
 
Hope, O. 2003. Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards and Analysts' 
Forecasts Accuracy: An International Study. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (2): 235-272. 
 
Kedia, S., and Rajgopal, S. 2009. Neighborhood Matters: The Impact of Location of Broad-
based Option Plans. Journal of Financial Economics 92 (April): 109-127 
 
Kedia, S., and Shivaram, R. 2010. The Influence of Geography on Financial Misreporting. 
Working paper, Rutgers University. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A., 2008. The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins. Journal of Economic Literature 46 (2): 285–332. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W., 1998. Law and Finance. 
Journal of Political Economy 106 (6): 1113–1155. 
 
 
Lang, M., Raedy, J. and Wilson, W. 2006. Earnings Management and Cross Listing: Are 
Reconciled Earnings Comparable to US Earnings? Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 
255-283.
 
85 
 
Lang, M., Raedy, J. and Yetman, M. 2003. How Representative are Firms that are Cross Listed 
in the United States? An Analysis of Accounting Quality. Journal of Accounting Research 41: 
363-386.  
 
Leuz, C. 2003. IAS versus U.S. GAAP: Information Asymmetry-based Evidence from 
Germany’s New Market. Journal of Accounting Research 41: 445-427. 
 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., and Wysocki, P.D., 2003. Earnings Management and Investor Protection: 
An International Comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69: 505-527. 
 
Merrell, J.C. 2011.  Ownership and Legal Origin: Evidence from Louisiana.  Working Paper, 
United States Air Force Academy. 
 
Minnis, M.C. 2010.  The Value of Financial Statement Verification in Debt Financing: Evidence 
from Private U.S. Firms.  Working Paper, University of Chicago. 
 
Moretau, O. 2008. The future of civil codes in France and Louisiana. Essays in Honor of Saul 
Litvinoff. Baton Rouge.  
 
Noreen, E. 1989. Computer-intensive Methods for Testing Hypothesis: An Introduction. New 
York, NY: Wiley. 
 
Palmer, V. 1999. Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction. Carolina Academic Press. 
Durham, North Carolina.  
 
Patatoukas, P.N. and Thomas, J.K. 2010. More Evidence of Bias in Basu (1997) Estimates of 
Conditional Conservatism. Working Paper, Yale University. 
 
Pope, P.F., and Walker, M. 1999. International Differences in the Timeliness, Conservatism, and 
Classification of Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 37 (Supplement): 53-87. 
 
Quebec Minister of Finance. 2009. Technical Paper: Bill Respecting Business Corporations.  
 
Seligman, J. 1983. The Historical Need for a Mandatory Disclosure System. The Journal of 
Corporation Law 9 (Fall): 1-61. 
 
Subramanyam, K.R. 1996. The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 22 (August-December): 249-281. 
 
Trueman, B., and Titman, S. 1988. An Explanation for Accounting Income Smoothing. Journal 
of Accounting Research 26 (Supplement): 127-139. 
 
Tucker, J., and Zarowin, P. 2006. Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness? 
The Accounting Review 81 (January): 251-270. 
  
 
86 
 
CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX  
 
Example of Firm’s Voluntary Disclosure Prior to the Eligibility Rule 
 
On June 20, 1998 Knox Nursery Inc. (OTCBB Ticker: KNUR) disclosed its income statement 
and balance sheet for the year ended December 31, 1997.  Knox Nursery Inc. made this 
disclosure through S&P Daily News.  As its names suggests, Knox Nursery Inc. sells plants. 
 
 
  
Income Statement (Thous. $)
Yr. Ended 
12/31/1997
Net Sales 5,647              
Costs & Expenses 5,803              
Operating Income (156)               
Interest Income 8                     
Gain on Sale of Equipment 5                     
Other Income (15)                 
Total Income (158)               
Depreciation & Amortization 675                 
Interest Expense 462                 
Capitalized Interest (32)                 
Income Tax (129)               
Net Income (1,134)            
EPS (0.14)              
Average Shares 8,001              
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CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX (continued) 
 
 
 
Balance Sheet (Thous. $)
12/31/1997
Assets:
Cash & Equivalents 44                   
Accounts Receivable, net 431                 
Inventories 893                 
Due from Officer 40                   
Other Current Assets 110                 
Total Current Assets 1,518              
Investments 14                   
Net Property 6,782              
Deferred Loan Costs 68                   
Total Assets 8,382              
Liabilities*:
Current Debt Maturing 864                 
Accounts Payable 981                 
Accruals 250                 
Total Current Liabilities 2,095              
Long Term Debt 4,313              
Long Term Deferred Income Tax 512                 
Due to Stockholders 85                   
Common Stock (p. $0.001) 8                     
Paid-in Capital 306                 
Retained Earnings 1,063              
Total Liabilities 8,382              
* The balance sheet format used by S&P Daily News labeled the Liabilities and Stockholders’  
   Equity section as Liabilities. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX A 
 
Provincial and Federal Corporate Acts and Regulators 
 
Province   Corporate Law      Regulator 
Alberta   Alberta Business Corporations Act   Alberta Securities Commission 
British Columbia  British Columbia Business Corporations Act  British Columbia Securities Commission 
Manitoba   Manitoba Corporations Act    Manitoba Securities Commission 
New Brunswick  New Brunswick Business Corporations Act  New Brunswick Securities Commission 
Newfoundland and Labrador Newfoundland Corporations Act   Newfoundland and Labrador, Securities Division  
Nova Scotia   Nova Scotia Companies Act    Nova Scotia Securities Commission 
Ontario   Ontario Business Corporations Act   Ontario Securities Commission 
Prince Edward Island  Prince Edward Island Companies Act    
Quebec   Quebec Companies Act    Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
Saskatchewan   Saskatchewan Companies Act   Saskatchewan Securities Commission 
Yukon Territory  Yukon Business Corporations Act   Registrar of Securities, Yukon Territory 
 
Federal   Canadian Business Corporate Act  
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CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX B: Evidence from Louisiana 
 
 
In the US, common law prevails at the federal level and at the state level, except for one 
state which has a French legal origin, Louisiana.  The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
requires what firms must register their securities.35  While securities regulation also arises in 
parallel at the state level, this is largely viewed as coordinated and subsumed by federal 
regulation.  In contrast to Canada, no incorporation statute, which affects corporate governance 
and shareholder rights, exists at the federal level.  U.S. companies must incorporate in a state and 
the majority chooses Delaware.  We note that some companies elect to incorporate in Louisiana.  
While Louisiana corporate law has integrated much of the common law structure, differences 
still remain (Merrell 2011).   
A common criticism of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) (and 
other across country studies) is that other factors might be causing the differences in the 
corporate governance outcomes that they document.  Religion, culture, language, and other 
factors are offered as alternative explanations for differences in ownership concentration.  
Examining ownership concentration in Louisiana provides a novel setting where religion, culture 
and language vary little when compared to other U.S. states.  By comparing the earnings 
attributes of firms in Louisiana, we are able to control for important confounding factors and 
further the literature on the effects of legal origin by potentially ruling out these alternative 
explanations.   
 
  
                                                  
35 Under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. 
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Background on Louisiana Law 
 Comparisons between Louisiana’s Code and other states’ laws can be difficult to 
enumerate.  There are two factors that make delineating the distinction difficult.  First, The Code 
is not meant to be a straight jacket but more of a set of safeguards (Moreteau 2008).  It might be 
more appropriate to compare The Code to The Constitution in this respect, particularly The Bill 
of Rights.  For instance, The Code specifies, “Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
life” and “Everyone has the right to respect of the presumption of innocence.”  Second, 
Louisiana is a state in the US and, therefore, is subject to the US Constitution and other federal 
laws.  Even though Louisiana law is melding closely with other state laws, there still remain non-
trivial variations that could potentially effect investor protections. 
 Today, Louisiana is a decidedly mixed jurisdiction based on civil and common law in 
which “civil law and common law meet, merge and interact at the level of legal rules, institutions 
and reasoning methods” (Palmer 1999).  Though mixed with common law, the civil code of 
Louisiana is still functioning.  As Louisiana Judge Dennis wrote in 2003, “[O]ur Civil Code 
endures and generally governs the all important area of Louisiana's private law” (Dennis 2003).  
 
An example of how investor protections, specifically minority shareholder rights, may 
differ under the Louisiana Civil Code can be found in the case Yuspeh v.  Koch.  In this case, 
Koch, a majority shareholder of Certified Security Systems, attempted to gain full control of the 
company via a freeze-out merger with a set cash price to buy out minority shareholders.  Yuseph 
and minority shareholders sued for what they deemed to be an inadequate stock price.  Further 
the minority shareholders had not been informed of Koch’s increased ownership of the company 
which was through unissued stock purchases via a loan restructuring agreement and, therefore, 
sued for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  Koch filed an exception of no right of action 
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arguing that Louisiana Revised Statute section 12:131 (from Louisiana’s Civil Code) was the 
sole remedy for obtaining the fair value for their shares.  This would have required Yuspeh to 
have used an injunction to slow the merger process and receive fair value for their shares.  The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Louisiana statue is not the exclusive remedy 
because it does not address fraud or breach of fiduciary responsibility.  Although the court ruled 
that no fraud was committed, it ruled there was a breach of fiduciary responsibility by not 
informing shareholders of the additional stock purchase.  This breach was a direct cause for the 
plaintiffs not being able to utilize the statue to obtain fair value for their positions.  Although the 
ruling helped align Louisiana’s protection of minority shareholder’s rights in this case 
(specifically similar to Delaware’s Weinberger v.  UOP, Inc.  decision), calls for a statute to 
better identify these protections remain.  “A new Louisiana appraisal rights statute should 
include a requirement that a minority shareholder be given proper shareholder notice before and 
after the merger vote to provide him with greater knowledge of his rights and responsibilities” 
(Aiken 2004).    
 
Data 
To identify our sample, we first identified firms incorporated or located in Louisiana on 
the Compustat Xpressfeed North America database from 1970 to 2009.  We retain all firms with 
necessary financial statement information to construct all seven attributes are available for each 
firm-year to mitigate concerns that differences in sample composition affect comparisons across 
attributes.  To construct annual returns, we obtain monthly returns data from CRSP.  We exclude 
firms in the financial and utilities industries.  The number of firms meeting these requirements is 
51. 
92 
 
We follow the same matching procedure as in the Quebec portion of our study, except 
that we match Louisiana firms with non-Louisiana firms (firms that are neither located or 
incorporated in Louisiana) on size and industry.  We do not match on the level of incorporation 
because unlike the Quebec portion of our study, no federal incorporation statute exists in the US.  
Following this procedure, we obtain a sample of 51 Louisiana firms (22 firms incorporated in 
Louisiana and 29 firms located but not incorporated in Louisiana) with 475 firm-year 
observations.  Untabulated results confirm an effective match on size. 
 
Earnings Attributes  
Table B1 compares all Louisiana firms, whether incorporated or located in Louisiana, to 
their non-Louisiana matched pairs.  We find that Conservatism is higher in firms with a French 
legal origin than a common law legal origin, consistent with our Quebec findings, and 
inconsistent with the hypothesis from Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000).  In general, however, we 
fail to document significant differences across the various earnings attributes.  This may be due 
to low statistical from our small sample size.  Alternatively, the presence of a strong federal 
regulator, the SEC, and federal securities regulation in the US may lead to comparable earnings 
quality across firms from common and civil law states. 
 
Further, the inclusion of firms located, but not incorporated in Louisiana, may add noise 
to our tests if only incorporation law, and not other aspects of Louisiana law, affects earnings 
quality.  In this case, comparing firms incorporated in Louisiana to their non-Louisiana matched 
pairs should provide the most powerful test for differences in earnings quality across civil and 
common law states.  Table B2 presents the earnings attributes for firms incorporated in 
Louisiana and their non-Louisiana matched pairs.  We find that Relevance is higher for the 
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Louisiana firms than for non-Louisiana firms.  However, in general we fail to find 
significant difference across the various earnings attributes.  As before, the lack of results may be 
attributable to the small sample size, or may be due to the strong federal regulatory environment 
in the US that results in similar earnings quality across common and civil law states. 
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Table B1:  Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Louisiana and Matched Non-
Louisiana Firms 
 
This table compares earnings attributes from Louisiana firms to their non-Louisiana matched 
pairs.  The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched sample and consists of 51 unique 
Louisiana firms and their matched pairs. Louisiana firms are matched to non-Louisiana firms on 
industry and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 475 firm-years.  
The statistical tests of differences are based on bootstrap-based tests (see Section 6 for details). 
 
Panel A: Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)  (2)  (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Louisiana Non-Louisiana Difference p-value 
Accrual Quality 0.070 0.063 0.007 0.15 
Persistence 0.555 0.797 -0.242 0.18 
Predictability 7.580 6.277 1.303 0.26 
Smoothness 1.265 1.181 0.084 0.36 
                  
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Accrual Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on 
future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations. Persistence is the 
estimated slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earnings. Predictability is the standard 
deviation of the residual from the Persistence regression. Smoothness is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations (scaled by assets).  
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Table B1:  Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Louisiana and Matched Non-
Louisiana Firms (continued) 
 
Panel B: Market-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)  (2)  (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Louisiana Non-Louisiana Difference p-value 
Relevance 0.104 0.047 0.057 0.19 
Timeliness 0.087 0.093 -0.006 0.43 
Conservatism 0.695 0.282 0.413 0.04 ** 
                  
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Relevance is the adjusted R2 from a regression of annual returns on the level and change in 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items). Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from a regression of 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator variable equaling one if the 
company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the 
interaction of the annual return and the indicator variable. Conservatism is the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction variable from the Timeliness regression. 
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Table B2:  Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Louisiana and Matched Non-
Louisiana Firms – Firms Incorporated in Louisiana 
 
This table compares earnings attributes from Louisiana firms that are incorporated in Louisiana 
to their non-Louisiana matched pairs.  The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched 
sample and consists of 22 unique Louisiana firms and their matched pairs. Louisiana firms are 
matched to non-Louisiana firms on industry and market value and all overlapping firm-years are 
retained resulting in 209 firm-years.  The statistical tests of differences are based on bootstrap-
based tests (see Section 6 for details). 
 
Panel A: Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Louisiana Non-Louisiana Difference p-value 
Accrual Quality 0.066 0.077 -0.011 0.13 
Persistence 0.555 0.801 -0.246 0.19 
Predictability 10.552 8.944 1.607 0.31 
Smoothness 1.546 1.254 0.292 0.14 
                    
 ***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed).  
 
Accrual Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on 
future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations. Persistence is the 
estimated slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earnings. Predictability is the standard 
deviation of the residual from the Persistence regression. Smoothness is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations (scaled by assets).  
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Table B2:  Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Louisiana and Matched Non-
Louisiana Firms – Firms Incorporated in Louisiana (continued) 
 
Panel B: Market-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Louisiana Non-Louisiana Difference p-value 
Relevance 0.051 0.027 0.024 0.01 *** 
Timeliness 0.073 0.050 0.023 0.32 
Conservatism 0.518 0.243 0.275 0.16 
                    
 ***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed).  
 
Relevance is the adjusted R2 from a regression of annual returns on the level and change in 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items). Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from a regression of 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator variable equaling one if the 
company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the 
interaction of the annual return and the indicator variable. Conservatism is the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction variable from the Timeliness regression. 
 
 
